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3Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on incentives and Chinese economic reform.
In the first essay, I collect a unique dataset of Chinese municipalities from 1978 to 
2007 to evaluate the impact of a Special Economic Zone experiment with incentives 
including property rights protection, tax breaks and a preferential land policy for 
foreign investors. Guided by a theoretical model, I find the SEZ policy: 1) increases per 
capita foreign direct investment by 58%; 2) does not crowd out domestic investment 
and 3) increases TFP growth rate by 0.6 percentage points. The results suggest that 
SEZs not only bring capital, but also more advanced technology.
In the second essay, I evaluate the fiscal incentive - the marginal sharing rate of 
fiscal revenue faced by Chinese provincial governments. In 1994, China engaged in a 
fiscal reform which set marginal sharing rates of budgetary taxes across provinces to 
a uniform level. Exploiting heterogeneity in the pre-reform budgetary sharing rate, I 
find that provinces with lower pre-existing rates collect more budgetary taxes; at the 
same time less extra-budgetary revenue after 1994 relative to those with higher starting 
level. The results suggest that Chinese provincial governments treat the budgetary 
tax and extra-budgetary revenue as substitutes.
The third essay studies the impact of Chinese municipal governments’ fiscal shar­
ing rate on the local economy. The fiscal regime change in 2002 largely reduced the 
local sharing rate of enterprise income tax. I find that municipal governments respond 
to this change by allocating more resources including land and capital into the real 
estate sector, leading to social conflicts between local governments and farmers whose 
lands were taken with low compensation. The results imply that regional decentral­
ization has to be matched with well-designed incentives to benefit the majority of the 
population within the jurisdictions.
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Preface
Capital shortage, low skilled production technology and passive governments are 
among the issues which prevent developing countries from growing as the neoclas­
sical model has predicted. As such, these problems are of intrinsic economic interest. 
By improving our understanding of these issues, we can better structure policy to 
help alleviate these traps. Methodologically, I exploit Chinese economic reforms since 
1979, which constitutes a unique laboratory for studying development policies aimed 
at tackling the problems above. Despite the fact that my thesis uses Chinese data, the 
mechanisms implied from Chinese reforms, for example, how foreign investors respond 
to the incentive package embedded in Special Economic Zone experiment, how local 
governments react to fiscal incentive, viz. the marginal sharing rate of fiscal revenue, 
are not only applied to China, but also have wide applications in many other countries. 
The three chapters are laid out along similar lines: each of them looks at behavior 
relating to incentives. A theoretical framework is presented, from which predictions 
are extracted. The predictions are subjected to empirical analysis afterwards.
Capital as well as advanced technology is typically desirable for development. 
Many nations around the world have established Special Economic Zones, which axe 
contained geographic regions within countries and are typically characterized by lib­
eral laws and economic policies, to attract foreign capital, boost exports and absorb 
advanced technology. However, there are no empirical studies on the SEZs using 
systematic statistical evidence. In the first chapter, I fill the gap by exploiting the 
gradual establishment of SEZs across Chinese municipalities to make contributions to 
our understanding of the impact of SEZs on foreign direct investment and technology 
progress.
First, I develop a simple model mapping the foreign investor location decision to 
the municipal macroeconomic outcome. Then, I use this model to assess empirically 
the importance of the Special Economic Zone experiment for productivity. Exploiting 
the gradual expansion of SEZs in Chinese municipalities, I find that SEZs with incen­
tives including property rights protection, tax breaks and a preferential land policy 
for foreign investors not only bring capital, but also boost total factor productivity 
growth.
Extensive work has examined how to design contracts with effective incentives to 
motivate firms and individuals. However, the channel of public organizations respond­
ing to incentives, thus how to motivate governments, is understudied empirically. We 
often read in various publications that local governments in developing countries are 
not as accountable and efficient as they ideally should be. The second chapter then 
aims to examine the fiscal compensation scheme between China’s sub-national gov­
ernments and national government. It evaluates the effects of fiscal incentives on 
provincial government’s fiscal effort and sheds light on how government agencies re­
act to incentives under a multi-tasking framework. Contract theory predicts that in
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general, if the agent faces two tasks, the optimal effort on each task will depend on 
the sharing rates of both tasks. Changing one task’s marginal sharing rate will cause 
changes to the productivity of both tasks.
From 1980 to 1993, China implemented a fiscal contracting regime. Provincial 
governments signed fiscal contracts with national government, in which they agreed 
on a local marginal sharing rate. Marginal sharing rates on budgetary revenue during 
this period exhibited cross-province variations. In addition to budgetary revenue, 
there is an extra-budgetary revenue that they have been allowed to set aside since the 
early 1980s and on which they enjoy a 100% sharing rate. In 1994, China’s national 
government engaged in one of the largest fiscal reforms on record that set marginal 
sharing rates of budgetary taxes across provinces to a uniform level.
My identification strategy combines the introduction of this reform with the cross­
province differences in pre-reform marginal sharing rates. After the reform, I find 
that on one hand, in the budgetary category, business tax revenue, enterprise income 
tax revenue and value added tax revenue increased more in provinces that previously 
had lower marginal sharing rates relative to those that had higher rates. On the 
other hand, in the extra-budgetary revenue category, provinces with lower pre-1994 
budgetary sharing rates devote less effort to extra-budgetary revenue collection after 
the reform, relative to provinces with higher pre-1994 marginal sharing rates. The 
results suggest that local governments treat the budgetary tax revenue and extra- 
budgetary revenue as substitutes. The policy implications drawn from the findings 
would be to provide local governments with a higher fiscal sharing rate will help 
enhance their effort.
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the effect of the intergovernmental revenue sharing rate 
on provincial government’s fiscal effort and shed light on how government agencies 
react to incentives under a multi-tasking framework. Despite the fact that various 
categories of fiscal revenue are used as the ultimate outcomes to capture fiscal effort, I 
can not explore the exact channels of such efforts due to data constraints. The change 
in fiscal revenue might come from the local governments’ effort at better enforcement 
or through boosting fiscal revenue base, and the third chapter attempts to disentangle 
these channels. In Chapter 3, I move one level below and investigate how municipal 
governments react to the powerful fiscal incentive change in terms of their economic 
development strategy. In contrast to the previous chapter, I can explicitly pin down 
the mechanisms by which local governments influence regional economy. Guided by 
the analytical framework from a multi-tasking agent model, I test the impact of the 
exogenous fiscal regime change in 2002 that greatly reduced the local sharing rate 
of enterprise income tax on municipal governments. I find supporting evidence that 
municipal governments respond to a reduced local sharing rate of enterprise income 
tax by allocating more resources, especially land, from agriculture into the real estate 
sector. On one hand, by switching their development focus to urbanization as artic­
ulated in the recent real estate boom, local governments benefit greatly from fiscal
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categories including business tax revenue and land sale extra-budgetary revenue. On 
the other hand, the huge amount of land conversion and escalating real estate price 
causes worsening social conflicts between local governments and the general public 
including farmers whose lands were taken with low compensation and residents who 
are unable to afford the housing price.
The findings suggest that regional decentralization should be matched with well- 
designed incentives for local governments and property rights for disadvantaged groups 
such as farmers. After all, the aim of decentralization is not just about motivating 
local governments to promote overall GDP growth or fiscal revenue, but essentially 
about making local governance more responsive to local needs and bringing the utmost 
benefits to the large majority of the local population.
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1 The Economic Impact of Spe­
cial Economic Zones: Evidence 
from Chinese M unicipalities
1.1 In tro d u ctio n
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are contained geographic regions within countries - a 
demarcated area of land used to encourage industry, manufacturing, and services for 
export, and are typically characterized by more liberal laws and economic policies than 
a country’s general economic laws1. Since 1979, China has gradually created SEZs 
in its municipalities with property rights protection, tax breaks and a preferential 
land policy specifically for foreign investors. This SEZ experiment has transformed 
China into one of the largest FDI recipients, exporters and foreign exchange reserve 
holders in the world2. Figure 1.1 displays the significant correlation between the SEZ 
experiment and FDI outcome in China.
China is a prominent member in the group of countries which have experimented 
with the SEZs, and many other nations being from Asia to Latin America, Europe 
and Africa have turned to SEZs to attract foreign capital, boost exports, create jobs, 
stimulate industry and improve upon existing infrastructure. According to the World 
Bank’s latest report on SEZs released in 2008, "by some estimates, there are approx­
imately 3,000 zones in 135 countries today, accounting for over 68 million direct jobs 
and over $500 billion of direct trade-related value added within zones." Despite the 
fact tha t the SEZs have extensively influenced many countries, to my knowledge, there 
are no empirical studies on the SEZs using systematic statistical evidence.
In this paper, I exploit the establishment of SEZs in China since 1979, which con­
stitutes a unique laboratory for the study of SEZs, to make three contributions to our 
understanding of the impact of SEZs on foreign direct investment and other outcomes. 
To do so, I collected a comprehensive new dataset on Chinese municipalities at which 
level the Special Economic Zone experiments were carried out. First, I estimate the ef­
fectiveness of Special Economic Zones on attracting foreign direct investment, mainly 
in the form of foreign-invested and export-oriented industrial enterprises. Second, I 
estimate the effect of Special Economic Zone policy on the domestic investment and 
capital stock of the municipality. Finally, in addition to physical capital, I also check 
whether the Special Economic Zone brings more advanced technology, i.e. higher total
1 Refer to Semil Shah (2008).
2 According to Prasad and Wei (2006), over the past decade, China has accounted for about one- 
third of gross FDI flows to all emerging markets and about 60 percent of these flows to Asian emerging 
markets. Even excluding flows from Hong Kong to China from these calculations (on the extreme 
assumption that all of these flows represent “round-tripping” of funds originating in China), China’s 
share in these flows is still around 20% of all emerging markets and 50% of those flows to Asian 
emerging markets.
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factor productivity growth.
The Chinese central government did not compile detailed information on the year 
and location of the creation of the SEZs until 2006. In 2008, in order to celebrate 
the 30th anniversary of "Open Door" reform3, China published brand new economic 
statistics on municipalities, mainly growth-accounting data. This is the first time 
that China prepared comprehensive statistics at the municipal level covering main 
economic indicators between 1978 and 2007. Based on these sources, I construct a new 
dataset for 326 Chinese municipalities4 containing information on GDP, investment, 
employment, foreign direct investment, exports as well as a digital GIS map of Chinese 
municipalities which is coded with the year the SEZ is created. This dataset allows 
me to track the evolution of China’s municipal economies before, during and after 
the expansion of Special Economic Zones. Information on municipal GDP, investment 
and employment are particularly important, because they enable me to identify the 
channel through which municipalities gain from the expansion of Special Economic 
Zones (as I describe explicitly below).
To guide my empirical analysis, I develop a simple model mapping the foreign 
investor location decision to the municipal macroeconomic outcome. I use this model 
to assess empirically the importance of the Special Economic Zone experiment for 
productivity, since having FDI increases not only capital stock but also total factor 
productivity growth (i.e. technology5). The conceptual framework generates three 
hypotheses that drive my three step empirical analysis:
1. Special Economic Zones, by combining private property rights protection, tax 
break and preferential long-term land use fee, attract foreign direct investment;
2. Special Economic Zones, depending on possible crowding-out and crowding-in 
effects of FDI, may or may not change domestically owned capital formation;
3. Special Economic Zones, if bringing more advanced FDI, will boost the municipal 
technology progress, i.e. total factor productivity growth.
Because China gradually expanded the Special Economic Zone experiment to 
its municipalities, I am able to identify the effect by exploring cross time within- 
municipality and cross municipality within-year variations. Despite the fact that al­
most all Chinese municipalities (300 out of 326 in my sample) carried out Special 
Economic Zone experiments by the end of 2007, there are still big concerns about po­
tential endogeneity of the Special Economic Zone granting sequence and the validity of 
its estimated effects. Therefore, I use three strategies to mitigate this concern. First, I 
add municipality specific trend to control for unobserved changes in the local economic
3 Basically, Open Door reform means liberalization.
4 My dataset includes 326 out of 333 municipalities in China. Details are given in the data appendix.
5 An ideal variable to measure municipal technology is patents. However, there is no well kept 
statistics on municipality level patents from 1978 to 2007. Therefore, I use TFP as a proxy.
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environment which might be correlated with the timing of SEZ establishment. Second, 
the potential endogeneity of the timing of SEZ establishment might make the munic­
ipalities that carried out the SEZ experiment later an unsuitable comparison group 
to those granted the SEZs earlier and consequently cast doubt on the validity of the 
estimated effects. I collected data on geographical location, industrial condition and 
human capital, based on which the State-council of China granted Special Economic 
Zones to municipalities in earlier years. This allows me to match municipalities which 
experimented with SEZs earlier to municipalities which experimented with SEZs later 
that are comparable in these indicators considered relevant for the outcomes under 
analysis. In this matching exercise each municipality which had SEZs in earlier years 
is matched with its closest counterpart which had SEZs in later years along these three 
dimensions. This approach implies that I am comparing early treated municipalities 
to late treated municipalities that are similar in terms of these three indicators before 
the Special Economic Zone experiment was carried out in China. Third, to prevent the 
results from being largely driven by the municipalities which had SEZs in earlier years 
and potentially had the most serious selection problem, I also examine the estimates 
restricting my sample to those municipalities which had SEZs in later years.
Moreover, there are concerns that foreign firms anticipate the SEZ establishment 
and thus delay their investment projects to coincide with the opening of the SEZ. I 
therefore run a placebo test and find that there was no hike or dip before the SEZ 
experiment took place and that the increase in FDI related outcome started only 
after the experiment. As a result, there is no anticipation of SEZs by foreign firms, 
encouraging the interpretation that SEZs have attracted FDI, increased exports and 
industrial output by foreign invested enterprises. Furthermore, we might worry that 
the foreign direct investment SEZs attract might not only come from creation effect, 
but also from diversion effect. Thus, I run empirical exercise to separately identify 
those two effects. The results indicate the co-existence of sizable creation effect and 
partial diversion effect by the Chinese SEZ experiment.
This paper contributes to the literature on Special Economic Zones6, as well as a 
large literature on estimating the economic impacts of foreign direct investment7. My 
work to empirically examine the Special Economic Zone experiment under a cross­
6According to Aradhna Aggarwal, Mombert Hoppe and Peter Walkenhorst (World Bank), cur­
rent work on SEZs are mainly case studies including Willmore (1996) on Export Processing in the 
Caribbean; Kung (1985), Ge (1999) and Park (1997) on detailed descriptions of SEZ policy in China; 
Rolfe et. al. (2004) on incentives of Kenyan Special Economic Zone; Aggarwal (2005) on Comparative 
Analysis of Special Economic Zone performance in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, etc.
Litwack and Qian (1998) develop a theory for a transition economy (China) under which an unbal­
anced development strategy favors special economic zones.
7 Some papers view the benefit of FDI as important source of capital stock using country level data, 
such as Whalley and Xin(2006), McGrattan and Prescott (2009), Desai, Foley and Hines Jr. (2009); 
other work focused on FDI as important sources of technology spillover, for example, Coe, Helpman 
and Hoffmaister (2009) use cross-country data to estimate the impact of domestic and foreign R&D 
capital stocks on TFP; Liu (2008) used a large panel of Chinese manufacturing firms to the effect of 
FDI on domestic firm TFP. Hale and Long (2007) using a firm-level data set on China, fail to find 
evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI.
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municipality framework is an important complement for current research on Special 
Economic Zone performance which are mainly case and theoretical studies8. My pa­
per evaluates the impact of FDI brought by the SEZs at the municipal level and so 
builds a bridge between country level and firm level studies. Empirical work using cross 
country data have suffered from an omitted variable problem since different countries 
are characterized by very different institutional and cultural features, which may well 
correlate with foreign direct investment. Meanwhile, research using firm level data 
could provide cleaner estimates under a stronger identification strategy and pin down 
accurately how foreign multinational firms interact with domestic firms. However, 
these studies can say little about macro-level impact of foreign direct investment on 
the domestic economy. Because this paper uses the variation within Chinese munic­
ipalities, many of the institutional, cultural, and policy variables tha t confound the 
relationship between the Special Economic Zone experiment and macroeconomic out­
comes at the country level are held constant, which increases the inferential validity. 
Another advantage of my study is tha t I can say more about the channels of causa­
tion from a macroeconomic perspective. In particular, I can distinguish between the 
effects of the Special Economic Zone experiment operating through increasing foreign 
owned capital in the municipality, and those operating through boosting total factor 
productivity growth.
There are of course disadvantages regarding my estimates on the Special Economic 
Zone experiment. China’s Special Economic Zone experiment is a combination of 
private property rights protection, tax breaks and a preferential land policy for foreign 
investors. It is therefore difficult separately to identify the elasticity of foreign direct 
investment with respect to private property rights protection, tax reduction and land 
use fee discount9.
The next section introduces the historical background of China’s Special Economic 
Zone experiment and provides a brief description on my dataset. Section 1.3 presents 
a simple model mapping the foreign investor location decision to municipal macroeco­
nomic outcomes which generates three predictions for empirical testing. Section 1.4 
estimates the direct impact of Special Economic Zones on foreign direct investment 
related outcomes. Section 1.5 estimates the effect of the Special Economic Zone ex­
periment on the composition of municipal investments, therefore the impact on the 
physical capital stock. Section 1.6 calculates the effect of Special Economic Zones on 
total factor productivity growth. Section 1.7 concludes.
8The only exception is Wei (1995). He has exploited Chinese city level data from 1980-1990 to 
examine a reduced-form relationship between the open-door (SEZ) policy proxied by FDI and exports, 
and Chinese growth. However, his dataset does not report investment, which prevents his study from 
exploiting a complete growth accounting framework.
9Du et. al. (2009) examines the impact of economic institutions, including property rights pro­
tection and contract enforcement, on the location choice of foreign direct investment from a data 
set of 6,288 U.S. multinationals investing in various China’s regions; Devereux and Maffini (2006) 
summarized the empirical literature on the impact of taxation on the location of FDI.
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1.2  B ackground  an d  D a ta
In this section I discuss some essential features of the Special Economic Zone experi­
ment and the data that I have collected in order to analyze how the municipal economy 
changed with the SEZs.
1.2.1 Special Economic Zone Experim ent R eview
China’s administrative system has five hierarchical levels of government: (1) central; 
(2) provincial; (3) municipal; (4) county; and (5) township. In this paper, I focus 
on the municipal level where the Special Economic Zone experiment has been carried 
out.
In the late 1970s, approval was given by the State Council for small-scale SEZ 
experiments in four remote southern cities, including Shen Zhen, Zhuhai and Shantou 
in Guangdong Province, as well as Xiamen in Fujian Province. Importantly, given 
the fact that China started with virtually zero foreign direct investment and almost 
negligible trade before 1978, these zones were used as a "test base" for liberalization 
of trade, tax and other policies that were then gradually applied to the rest of the 
economy. In August 1980 the People’s Congress passed the first legal rule on the 
SEZs: “the Regulation for Guangdong SEZs.” This regional law was the first of its 
kind to be tested, which was drafted with the help of legal experts sent from the 
central government (Cai et al., 2008). When the experiment was expanded into other 
provinces, they also adopted and modified this law accordingly10. The law of SEZs 
explicitly provides the following policy packages for foreign investors:
1) Private Property Rights Protection11: the SEZs encourage foreign citizens, 
overseas Chinese, compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao and their companies and 
enterprises (hereinafter referred to as "investors") to open factories and set up enter­
prises and other establishments with their own investment or in joint ventures with 
Chinese. The SEZs guarantee to protect their assets, accruing profits and other rights 
in accordance with the law. This is a very important commitment by the Chinese 
government since there was no constitutional protection of private property rights 
outside SEZs until recently (the 2004 constitutional amendment).
2) Tax incentives: foreign investors can enjoy a reduced rate (15-24%) of corporate 
income tax compared to 33% paid by domestic firms. They bear virtually zero custom 
duties and can enjoy duty free allowances for production materials. There are income 
tax exemptions for foreigners working in SEZs as well12;
10The Central Government Circular No.50, 1979, Zhongfa (1979) 50. The details of the political 
decision making process are comprehensively summarized in Xu (2009).
n Besley (1995), Besley and Ghatak (2010): "Property insecurity acts much like a random tax on 
land, and thus reduct invest incentive".
12 World Bank (2008): "There has been a great deal of debate regarding the types of fiscal incentives 
and other privileges at the heart of an SEZ regime. Countries are under pressure to offer a generous 
package of tax and duty exemptions in order to keep pace with their competitors. The package of fiscal 
incentives has become almost standardized among zones internationally—corporate tax reductions
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3) Land use policy13: under Chinese law, all land is under state ownership. Foreign 
investors may lawfully obtain the rights for land development, use and business. They 
may also transfer and lease land rights, or put them up for mortgage in accordance 
with the law within the stipulated purposes and terms of the use. When foreigners 
invest in projects encouraged by the State for an operation term of more than 15 
years, the construction land is exempt from land use fees for five years starting from 
the day when the enterprise obtains the use right, and the fee is collected at half price 
in the following five years. The land use right is guaranteed for projects that have 
a total investment of US $10 million, or that are technologically advanced and have 
a major influence on the local economic development despite total investment being 
below US $10 million.
4) Liberal economic and labor laws: there axe limited restrictions on foreign own­
ership. Foreign invested firms have the power to hire and fire their employees.
The government made clear the targets of Special Economic Zones described by 4 
principles: " Construction primarily relies on attracting and utilizing foreign capital; 
primary economic forms are Sino-foreign joint ventures and partnerships as well as 
wholly foreign-oumed enterprises; products are primarily export-oriented; economic 
activities are primarily driven by market forces
Supported by the initial achievements of the first group of SEZs, in 1984, the cen­
tral government expanded the SEZ experiment to 14 other coastal cities to foreign 
investment14. From 1985 to 1988, the central government further included more mu­
nicipalities along the coastal area into the SEZ experiment15. In 1990, the Chinese 
government decided to open the Pudong New Zone in Shanghai to foreign investment, 
as well as more cities in the Yangtze River Valley. The pattern of granting SEZ status 
in earlier years is not purely random, according to state-council documents (1980- 
1990)16, the central government chose municipalities to be granted with the Special 
Economic Zones based on better geographical location, industrial condition and hu­
man capital.17 From 1992 to 1994, the State Council opened a number of border cities 
and all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. In addition, 222 
state-level economic zones and 1346 province-level economic zones18 were gradually 
established within the municipalities to provide better infrastructure and achieve ag­
or exemption; duty-free importation of raw material, capital goods, and intermediate inputs; no 
restrictions or taxes on capital and profits repatriation; exemption from foreign exchange controls 
(where applicable); no charges on exports; exemption from most local and indirect taxes; and so on."
13 Source: the government website of Zhejiang province.
14Listed north to south: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
15Listed north to south: Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei Province (which surrounds Beijing and Tianjin), 
Shandong Peninsula, Yangtze River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in southern Fujian 
Province, Pearl River Delta, and Guangxi.
16Refer to various State Council documents issued in 1984,1985,1987,1988,1991,1992,1993 for de­
tails.
17 China’s development strategy based on location is discussed in Demurger al. etc (2002).
18 State-level SEZs are granted by the central government; province-level SEZs are granted by provin­
cial governments.
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glomeration of foreign investors. As a result, a multilevel diversified pattern of opening 
and integrating coastal areas with river, border, and inland areas has been formed in 
China. China’s Special Economic Zone experiment is described by the World Bank 
as a unique Zones within Zone case because large opened economic zones (munici­
palities) hosted small economic zones (state-level and province-level economic zones) 
within each municipality’s territory. Figure 1.2 displays the geographic evolution of 
the Special Economic Zone experiment.
In Table 1.1, I summarize the four big waves in the SEZs experiment, i.e. 1979- 
1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2007. The ratio of municipalities with SEZs starts 
from 0% in 1978, to 9% in 1985, 24% in 1990, 69% in 1995 and 92% in 2007. The 
SEZ experiment was expanded from coastal areas, beginning with municipalities with 
average distance to the coast of 15 miles, and expanding to those municipalities with 
an average distance of 626 miles to the nearest coast. Also, the SEZs were experi­
mented using more industrial developed areas first, measured by higher average initial 
industrial output, and later expanded to less industrial developed areas. However, 
there are no significant statistical differences in human capital across the four groups 
of municipalities which were granted the SEZs at different times.
1.2.2 D a ta se t on  C hinese M unicipalities
In order to evaluate the impact of Special Economic Zones, I constructed a new panel 
dataset on 326 Chinese municipalities. The dataset tracks Chinese municipalities on 
GDP, investment, employment, foreign direct investment and exports as well as a 
digital GIS map of Chinese municipalities which is coded with its year of opening up 
and the SEZ establishment. Table 1.2 displays descriptive statistics for the variables 
that I use in this paper. The Data Appendix contains more details on the construction 
of these variables.
Special Econom ic Zone Index  In the dataset, I have detailed information which 
captures features of the SEZ experiment:
1. Lists of coastal and inland municipalities which were granted an open special 
economic area and the timing of granting;
2. Lists of state-level economic and technological development zones/ new and 
high-technology industrial development zones/ Export Processing Zones/ Border 
Economic Cooperative Zones within municipalities, the size of these zones within 
the municipality and the timing of granted establishment;
3. Lists of provincial economic and technological development zones/ new and high- 
technology industrial development zones, the size of these zones within the mu­
nicipality and the timing of granted establishment.
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Being granted the status of open special economic area means the whole area of 
the municipality is a large SEZ for foreign investors. Being granted the status of 
state-level or province-level economic zones means that within the municipality, cer­
tain geographical area is used as SEZs to host foreign investors. In the full sample, 
some municipalities were granted the status of open special economic areas as well 
as allowed to establish state-level and province-level economic zones within a certain 
geographical area inside the municipality in later years, i.e. a large SEZ can contain 
multiple "specific” zones within its boundaries. For example, some coastal munici­
palities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin and Guangzhou were allowed to 
construct more and larger zones within the municipality from the central government 
after they as a whole were granted the status of open economic areas. Most inland 
municipalities as a whole were not granted the status of open economic area. They 
just have relatively smaller and less economic zones constructed within its city area 
granted from higher level governments. Therefore, the intensity of the SEZ exper­
iment differs across municipalities and years. If I use three variables including an 
opening economic area dummy, accumulated size of state-level economic zones and 
accumulated size of province-level economic zones fully to explore the intensity of the 
SEZ treatment, the identification strategy is vulnerable to endogeneity problem, since 
the fact that coastal municipalities were granted with more and larger SEZs is highly 
correlated with their potential in attracting foreign direct investment. In order to 
alleviate the non-randomness regarding the treatment intensity and provide a much 
cleaner identification, I instead use a general SEZ dummy19,
SE Z dum m y  =  1, if the municipality as a whole is granted the status of open 
economic zone area, or a municipality is allowed to establish a state-level economic 
zone in a certain geographical area within the municipality, or the municipality is 
permitted to establish a province-level economic zone in a certain geographical area 
within the municipality;
SE Z dum m y = 0, if otherwise.
Despite various types and different names for SEZs, I checked the SEZ law for open 
special economic area, state-level SEZs and province-level SEZs respectively. There 
are no systematic policy differences regarding property rights protection, tax breaks 
or land use policy, which justify the validity of using a general SEZ dummy to capture 
this experiment.
F oreign  D irect Investm en t Data at the municipal level including utilized foreign 
direct investment, exports and industrial output by foreign invested enterprises are 
used to capture the direct outcome from the Special Economic Zone experiment.
Figure 1.3 plots the sample mean of the log of per capita foreign direct investment
19 To exploit more variation in the intensity of special economic zone reform, I run regressions on 
three variables, i.e. open economic zone area dummy, land area of state-level economic zone, land 
area of province-level economic zones as supplemental evidence. The results are consistent with using 
single treatment variable, i.e. SEZdummy.
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by year for four groups of municipalities classified based on the timing of the SEZ 
experiment. It reveals that the SEZ experiment boosts FDI significantly for every 
group. We observe FDI increasing significantly after each group of municipalities 
was granted the SEZ status. However, the effect seems to be much stronger for 
the municipalities which carried out the SEZ experiment earlier. To prevent biased 
estimates due to the potential selection problem, I use more rigorous methods in the 
main specification.
G row th  A ccounting  D a ta  The credibility of statistical data published by China’s 
statistical office is under scrutiny in various studies (Young, 2003; Holz, 2008). Having 
acknowledged the potential bias, apart from annual revisions to the national income 
and product accounts data first published in the previous year, China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics has so far conducted two benchmark revisions. The first occurred 
following the 1993 tertiary (service) sector census with adjustments to 1978-93 tertiary 
sector value added and, by implication, to the sum of sectoral value added, i.e., gross 
domestic product (GDP). The second benchmark revision occurred in early 2006, 
following the 2004 economic census of the secondary sector (industry, construction) 
and of the tertiary sector using the OECD method. My dataset is based on the 
latest municipal statistics after these adjustments. Following Caselli (2005) and Young 
(2003), I have constructed Real GDP, Real Capital Stock, human capital augmented 
labor and share of labor income.
1.3 A  C on cep tu a l Fram ew ork
Foreign Investor Location Decision:
In the context of the Special Economic Zone experiment in China, we need to 
consider the essential elements foreign investors took into account when they made 
the location decision. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (2007) 
carried out a survey regarding potential policy changes that most worried foreign 
enterprises. The results suggest that the incentive package the Special Economic 
Zone experiment provided, including tax incentives and favorable land policy, were 
among the key determinants of the location decision by foreign investors20. We assume 
that a foreign investor can choose from among 326 Chinese municipalities or other 
alternative countries to locate his investment. If the foreign investor decides to invest 
in municipality i, he maximizes his profits by choosing the level of investment, the 
quantity of land used as well as the quantity of labor hired in municipality i, i = 
0 ,1 ,2 ,..., 326, where i = 0 denotes outside option such as investing in other countries.
20 The Foreign Economic Research Institute of the NDRC (National Development and Reform Com­
mission) carried out a survey in 2007 on foreign firms located in the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River 
Delta and Areas Around Bohai. The top 5 ranked potential policy changes they worry about is Re­
moving Tax Incentive, RMB Appreciation, Removing Favorable Land Policy, Increased Environmental 
Requirement and Increased Worker Welfare.
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The investor’s problem, conditional on investing in municipality i21, can be written 
as follows:
M ax  7Ti = ( l - T i ) ( l - t i ) ( p q i - W i L i - R i L a n d i - r F D I i - F )
Li,FDIi,Landi
s.t. qi = Q (F D Ii,Landi,L i)
where: it * =  profits of the foreign investor if he invests in municipality i\ p =price 
of the product produced by the investor; qi — quantity of the product sold; Wi — 
wage rate in municipality i\ Li = quantity of labor employed by the foreign investor 
in municipality i\ Ri = land use fee paid by the foreign investor in municipality i\ 
Landi =  the land the foreign investor used for production in municipality i. r = 
opportunity cost of capital for the foreign investor; FD Ii =  foreign direct investment 
by the foreign investor in municipality i\ F  = fixed cost of production; U = corporate 
tax rate for the foreign investor in municipality i] T{ = probability of expropriation.
Given the first order condition with respect to investment FD Ii and inputs deci­
sions Landi> Li , profits 7r* will be a function of Ti,ti,R i,W i. The foreign investor will 
choose the municipality with the highest 7t* to locate its FDI22. Therefore, we can also 
model
F D I* = f(T i,U ,R i,W i\{i : n* > TTj,Vj ±  «})
Provided the policy set of the Special Economic Zone experiment including prop­
erty rights protection, i.e. lower t*; tax breaks, i.e. lower U and land fee discount, i.e. 
lower R i , it implies an estimating equation of the form leading to empirical step one 
below23:
LnF D Iu = Q. + r)* SEZdum m yu + X u p  +  £it
Xu  includes municipal control variables which would potentially influence the FDI 
decision in addition to property rights protection, tax rate and land use fee.
Capital Formation:
If the SEZ attracts FDI, it will in turn influence the capital formation process in 
the municipality. In particular,
directly, K ift = K ^ t - \  * (1 — delta) +  F D Iit(SE Z )/de fla to r  
indirectly, = Kidt-i * (1 — delta) +  D om lit(SE Z)fdefla tor
21 The maximization problem captures the intensive effect, i.e. how much to invest in municipality 
i conditional on locating there.
22 Comparing profits across all locating options, the investor chooses the one with the highest payoff. 
This decision essentially captures the extensive margin, i.e. whether or not to invest in municipality 
i.
23Due to data availability, the paper is not able to estimate the extensive margin (whether or not 
to invest in municipality i ) and intensive margin (how much to invest in municipality i conditional on 
locating there) separately. Therefore, the effect of SEZs on foreign direct investment is a combined 
intensive and extensive response.
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where K ^ t is foreign owned capital stock, FD Ia  is foreign owned investment; Kidt 
is domestically owned capital stock, D omla  is domestically owned investment. The 
interaction between domestic investment and foreign direct investment, i.e. crowding 
out or crowding in effect will determine the net effect of SEZs on capital formation. 
This drives the empirical step two below:
LnDom lit = 4> +  7 * SEZdum m ya  +  Xu/3 +  £it 
L nK idt =  <j) + j *  SE Zdum m y a 4- X it(3 +  £it
Technological Progress:
A very important policy motive behind subsidizing FDI is that FDI constitutes 
technologically more advanced capital compared to domestic capital. Based on Griliches 
(1986), the municipal aggregate production function can be modelled as
Yit = Aiex' t (Kit)a (H * L it)1- a
where Ka  =  (1 +  6)K ift +  Kidt> using 0 > 0 to denote higher quality of foreign 
capital compared to domestic capital; a  is the share of capital income in GDP24. Yu 
is real gross domestic output in municipality i at year £; H  * Lit is augmented labor in 
municipality i at year t\ Ai is the time-invariant component of total factor productivity 
in municipality i\ A* is the existing TFP growth rate of municipality i.
LnYit ~  LnAi +  A it +  a L n (K ft +  Kdt) -I- olQ +  (1 -  a)Ln{H Lit)
K / t  + K dt
Let S  =  Kft+KM denote the shaxe of foreign capital in the total capital stock, in terms 
of growth rate, we get
A T x , A (Kft  + K d t ) ^ ,  ,A  (HL)  , „A S
Y  it * +  “  (Kft  + K*)  + (  } (HL) i t + S  it
AT F P  , A S'' ~ — Ai -|- ftp———
T F P  it S  it
If there is any additional contribution 6 > 0 due to the presence of FDI as a result of 
the SEZ experiment, we would conclude that FDI boosts the technological progress 
in the municipality. This drives empirical step three below25:
A T F P  
=  A,- +  7  * SE Zdum m ya + £u1 r  P  it
24The Chinese statistics only reports GDP by the income approach at the provincial level. Therefore, 
in the paper, I use provincial capital share as the proxy for municipal capital share. In a later empirical 
section, I compared estimates using provincial capital share and national capital share and show the 
results are not sensitive to the capital share indicator I used.
257 > 0 <<=*► 0 > 0
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To relate the basic model in Section 1.3 to my dynamic empirical setting, I run 
three empirical sections (i.e. Steps 1 to 3). In Step 1, I evaluate the extent to which 
foreign direct investment responds to property rights protection, tax breaks and the 
land use fee discount embodied in the Special Economic Zone experiment. In Step 2,
I check the effect of the Special Economic Zone experiment on domestic investment 
and domestically owned capital stock. In Step 3, I examine whether the presence of 
FDI via the SEZs brings technology growth to a municipality.
1.4  E m pirica l S tep  O ne: SEZs on  F D I o u tco m es
1.4.1 Identification
The empirical test requires variation in the timing when SEZs were created across 
my sample of municipalities. As described in Section 1.2, the timing of the SEZ 
experiment across the Chinese municipalities provides a significant amount of variation 
both between and within municipalities during my sample period 1978-2007. I will 
exploit these different sources of variation in my identification strategy.
Baseline Specification In the baseline specification, the econometric analysis makes 
use of the full sample of 326 municipalities. Thus, the effects of the SEZ experiment 
on the FDI outcome will be estimated both from the cross-sectional variation (munic­
ipalities with SEZs versus municipalities without SEZs) and from the time variation 
in the SEZ experiment among the 300 treated municipalities (a municipality before 
being treated versus after being treated). My econometric analysis is based on panel 
data regressions of the form:
Yipt = ot +  j3 * SEZdummyipt +  5i -I- j t +  £ipt (1.1)
Yipt = a  + f3 * SEZdummyipt + 5i + 6P * (t — 1977) +  7 t +  £iPt (1-2)
Yipt = a  + /3* SEZdummyipt +  Si +  Si * (t -  1977) +  7t +  £ipt (1-3)
where Yipt is the outcome variable including foreign direct investment flow, exports 
and industrial output of foreign invested enterprises in municipality i of province p 
in year t. SEZdummyipt is the key variable indicating the Special Economic Zone 
experiment. 6i is the municipality fixed effect. j t is the year fixed effect. 5P is the 
province fixed effect. (t — 1977) is the trend starting from 1978 which is the beginning 
of my sample 26.
In the first econometric setting (equation 1.1), I use the municipality fixed effect 
to control for time-invariant municipal characteristics such as natural endowment and 
geographical location and the year fixed effect to control for common macroeconomic 
shocks happening to all Chinese municipalities in a particular year. In the second
26 As there are plenty of observations before the treatment (i.e. the SEZ experiment), linear 
trends are unlikely to pick up the post-treatment trends (Wolfers 2006).
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econometric setting (equation 1.2), I use the municipality fixed effect to control for 
time-invariant municipal characteristics and the province specific trend to control for 
the common path of municipalities in the same province. This setting controls for 
time-varying factors at the provincial level that potentially influence the timing of 
SEZ granting. In the third econometric setting (equation 1.3), I use the municipality 
fixed effect to control for time-invariant municipal characteristics, the year fixed effect 
to control for common macroeconomic shocks to all municipalities at year t and mu­
nicipality specific trends to control for time-varying reasons that municipalities were 
granted Special Economic Zone status. In this case, the identification of the effects of 
the Special Economic Zone experiment comes from whether such changes lead to devia­
tions from municipality specific trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered by municipality to deal with potential problems of serial correlation 
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004)).
M atch ing  Specification  In the matching specification, the difference with respect 
to the baseline specification is that I no longer make use of the full sample of late 
treated municipalities. Instead, I take advantage of the cross-sectional variation found 
for several socioeconomic measures to restrict the sample of municipalities which were 
granted SEZs in later years to the ones that more closely match the earlier treated 
municipalities in indicators considered relevant for the timing of the SEZ experiment 
and for the outcomes under analysis, as of 1978. This procedure restricts the sample 
to 247 municipalities that are substantially more comparable in terms of the indicators 
considered at the beginning of my sample period.
According to state council documents, by the early 1990s, the Special Economic 
Zone experiment was granted mostly in coastal, more industrial developed and more 
educated areas. The selection criteria are likely to affect the propensity for a munic­
ipality to be granted SEZs earlier and are also likely to be instrumental in affecting 
FDI related outcomes. I create a D = 1 if the municipality had the Special Economic 
Zone experiment by the end of 1992, i.e. earlier treated; D = 0 if the municipality 
carried out the Special Economic Zone experiment after 1992, i.e. later treated27. I 
use per capita industrial output, per capita number of secondary school students in 
1978 and distance to the nearest coast to estimate the propensity score based on a 
probit model
Pr{D =  1|X} =  Pt{D = 1|X =  (•industrial output, education attainm ent, 
geographical location)} =  (^(X'P)
In the matching exercise, I rank all 326 municipalities based on the estimated 
propensity score, and for each earlier treated municipality I select its closest later 
treated municipality as a control group (nearest neighbor approach). In the matched 
sample, I have 247 municipalities, among which 167 municipalities were granted SEZs
27The matching exercise was implemented based on the advice from Joshua Angrist.
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between 1979 and 1992 and 80 municipalities were allowed to create SEZs after 199228. 
Table 1.3 displays the probit regression results and the quality before and after using 
neaxest-neighbor matching. Since we do not match the sample conditioning on all co- 
variates but on the propensity score, it has to be examined if the matching procedure 
is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control and 
treatment group. There are two measures to check whether there remain any differ­
ences after conditioning on the propensity score. First, the pseudo-R2: Sianesi (2004) 
suggests reestimating the propensity score on the matched sample, that is only on 
participants and matched non-participants and compare the pseudo-R2s before and 
after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X  explain the par­
ticipation probability. After matching there should be no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between both groups and therefore, the pseudo-R2 should 
be fairly low. Table 1.3a indicates that before matching the Pseudo-R2 is 0.10; after 
matching, the Pseudo-R2 reduces to 0.03. Second, T-test: in Table 1.3b, the T-test 
suggests that all three important selection criteria become insignificant after match­
ing, which means there are no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates 
between the control group (the municipalities which had SEZs in later years) and the 
treatment group (the municipalities which had SEZs in earlier years). This match­
ing procedure reduces the size of the sample available for econometric analysis, but 
increases my confidence that I am effectively tracking municipalities across time that 
are more comparable in aspects that are relevant for the effects I want to estimate.
L a te r  SEZs O nly  Specification The matching procedure above does not com­
pletely eliminate concerns about the existence of unobservable factors that might 
systematically affect the likelihood of being granted SEZs earlier and also affect the 
outcome variables of interest. It is possible, for instance, that the municipalities which 
were granted SEZs earlier could have very different abilities for attracting FDI com­
pared to municipalities which were granted SEZs later on. These specific characteris­
tics might have led them to be granted SEZs earlier on and perform more successfully 
in FDI absorption. The positive correlation between the SEZ experiment and FDI 
related outcome observed in the full sample may be wrongly interpreted as capturing 
the impact of the SEZs, if only the group of earlier treated municipalities drove the 
main results. To address this concern I restrict the sample available for analysis to 
the group of municipalities which only had SEZs since 1990s. The sample drops 79 
municipalities which were allowed to construct SEZs between 1979 and 1990 and is 
therefore reduced to a group of 247 municipalities.29
28 Refer to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for practical guidance on propensity score matching; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for the principle of matching. I have checked the common support and 
the balancing properties, which were all satisfied in my matching exercise. Some municipalities in the 
control group were used more than once in the matching, i.e. matching with replacement.
29Though in matching, the number of the sample is 247 municipalities as well, the composition of 
matched sample and later SEZs sample is different.
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1.4.2 E m pirica l R esu lts
In Table 1.4, Panel A, I run a regression using per capita foreign direct investment, 
which is the first-order target of the Special Economic Zone experiment. In Panel 
B, I run a regression using per capita exports, which is another goal of the Special 
Economic Zone policy to boost trade related activities. In Panel C, I run a regression 
using per capita industrial output of foreign invested enterprises, which is to confirm 
that foreign direct investment came to municipalities with the Special Economic Zone 
experiment to produce and export its product.
In Table 1.4, Panel A, Columns (1) to (3), the results are robust to baseline spec­
ifications. In Column (3), after controlling for fixed effects and municipality specific 
trend, the results suggest that having Special Economic Zone status increases per 
capita foreign direct investment by 58%. Column (4) reports the estimates for the 
restricted matched sample. The results still suggest the SEZ experiment increases 
per capita FDI by 54%. In Column (5), when I only use the group of the munici­
palities which were granted SEZs after 1990, the magnitude of the coefficient slightly 
decreased, but still suggests a 43% increase due to the SEZ experiment.
In Panel B, Column (3) indicates that having the SEZ experiment increases mu­
nicipal per capita exports by 84%. Column (4) reports the estimates for the restricted 
matched sample. The result suggests the SEZ experiment increases per capita exports 
by 81%. In Column (5), when I only use the group of the municipalities which were 
granted SEZs after 1990, the magnitude of the coefficient still suggests a 70% increase 
in exports due to the SEZ experiment. The estimates confirm the contribution of the 
Special Economic Zone experiment on attracting vertical FDI, which takes advantage 
of low-cost production in China for products to be exported and which is fueled mostly 
by China’s Asian neighbors30.
In Panel C, Column (3) indicates that having the SEZ experiment increases per 
capita industrial output of foreign invested enterprises by 64%. Column (4) reports 
the estimates for the restricted matched sample. The result suggests the SEZ experi­
ment increases per capita industrial output of foreign invested enterprises by 69%. In 
Column (5), when I only use the group of the municipalities which were granted SEZs 
after 1990, the magnitude of the coefficient still suggests a 45% increase due to the 
SEZ experiment.
1.4.3 R o b u stn ess  Check
P laceb o  T est There are concerns that foreign firms anticipate the SEZ establish­
ment and thus delay their investment projects to coincide with the opening of the 
SEZ. If it was the case, the positive coefficient of S E Z  dummy in equation (1.3) might 
just reflect foreign firm’s reallocation of investment across time, which is wrongly in­
terpreted as the causal effect of SEZs on FDI. To validate the identifying assumption,
30Refer to Whalley & Xin (2006) and Ekholm et al. (2007).
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I estimate the dynamics of FDI related outcome before and after the SEZ experiment. 
Specifically, I replace SE Z dum m y  in equation (1.3) with the set of year-wise dummy 
variables which equal to one if n years have passed since the year of having the Special 
Economic Zone experiment, where - 2  <  n < 2 , and another dummy variable equal to 
1 if three years or more have passed.
2
Yipt — <x+ Pn * D (T  n)jpt + P3 * D (T + 3 ) ^  +  Sj 4- 6j * (t —1977) +  7 1 + £jpt (1.4)
7 1 =  — 2
Table 1.5 reports the estimates on the coefficient of the set of dummy variables. 
The point estimates suggest that there was no hike or dip before the SEZ experiment 
took place and that the increase in FDI related outcome started only after the exper­
iment. As a result, there is no anticipation of SEZs by foreign firms, encouraging the 
interpretation that SEZs have attracted FDI, increased exports and industrial output 
by foreign invested enterprises.
T est for D iversion  Effect There are concerns that the foreign direct investment 
SEZs attract is not from creation effect, but from diversion effect. When the SEZ 
experiment is in place, foreign investors might change their location decision from 
neighboring non-SEZ municipalities or neighboring non-SEZ provinces to municipal­
ities with SEZs. If this is the case, SEZs merely redistribute FDI within Chinese 
municipalities. As a result, I consider two possible diversion cases as follows:
Case I: Municipalities with SEZs divert FDI from neighboring municipalities with 
no SEZs, i.e. a change of distribution within the province. The prediction of full di­
version story in Case I will be that at the provincial level, the number of municipalities 
with SEZs does not matter for the level of per capita FDI a province attracts. Figure
1.4 shows that there is a strong positive correlation between the proportion of munic­
ipalities with SEZs in the province and per capita provincial FDI, which contradicts 
the full diversion story.
Case II: Municipalities with SEZs divert FDI from other provinces with no SEZs,
i.e. a change of distribution within China. It is possible that when some municipalities 
carry out the SEZ experiment, the FDI attracted is diverted from other provinces. The 
empirical prediction will be that at national level, the number of municipalities with 
SEZs does not m atter for the level of per capita FDI China attracts. This possibility 
of full diversion is ruled out by Figure 1.1, which shows a clear positive correlation 
between the number of municipalities with SEZs and the FDI China attracts.
Though the most extreme version of the diversion story where there is no creation 
at all can be ruled out, there might be partial diversion. The ideal test to separately 
identify the creation effect and diversion effect will be to regress the municipal FDI on 
its own SE Z dum m y  and the indicator of other SEZ in the same province or nearby
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provinces.
Yipt =  ct +Pi*SEZdum m yipt + (32*OtherSEZipt + 5i + 8i*(t —1977)+ j t +£ipt (1.5)
We would expect a positive coefficient, /31, of its own SE Z dum m y  to capture the 
creation effect and a negative coefficient, (32> °f dummy variable indicating if there 
is any other nearby SEZ for the diversion effect. O therSEZipt = 1 if there is any 
other SEZ in the same province or nearby provinces; O therSEZiPt — 0 otherwise.
In Panel A, B and C of Table 1 .6 , the coefficients of SE Z dum m y  are all positive 
and the magnitude remains similar to those in Table 1.4. It confirms that there is 
significant creation effect by the SEZ experiment on the municipal FDI outcome. The 
coefficients of O therSE Z  are negative and significant, suggesting that there is indeed 
sizable diversion effect by other nearby SEZs. The magnitude of the creation effect 
is larger than the diversion effect, which provides us with the relative importance 
of those two effects. In Panel C, for industrial output of foreign enterprises, the 
coefficients of O therSE Z  are larger than those of SE Z dum m y , which might be due 
to the truncated sample size. The statistics of foreign industrial output only cover 
years being 1987-1991 and 1999-2008.
1.5 E m pirica l S tep  Two: SE Z s an d  D o m estic  C ap ita l F orm ation
In this section, I investigate the effect of SEZs on domestic capital formation. On 
the one hand, foreign direct investment flow may reduce domestic investment due to 
crowding-out and competition, which might decrease the impact of the SEZ experi­
ment on domestically owned capital stock. On the other hand, the SEZs may bring 
benefits and spillovers to domestic firms. Complementary domestic investment may 
increase if the foreign investment projects become integrated in the domestic industrial 
chain and establish forward and backward linkages. The econometric specifications I 
used in this section to control endogeneity are similar to section 1.4 (empirical step 
one).
In Table 1.7, Panel A contains regression on domestic investment at the municipal 
level. Panel B contains regressions on municipal physical capital stock (domestically 
owned capital stock). In Panel A, Columns (1 ) to (5), under different specifications, 
there is no significant evidence suggesting sizable effect of domestically owned invest­
ment by the SEZs. According to the aggregate municipal data, each unit of FDI will 
contribute to the capital formation process without reducing domestic capital accu­
mulation31 . However, the results cannot rule out the existence of either crowding-out
31Yasheng Huang (2003), "the large absorption of foreign direct investment (FDI) by China is a 
sign of some substantial weaknesses in the Chinese economy. The primary benefits associated with 
China’s FDI inflows are concerned with the privatization functions supplied by foreign firms, venture 
capital provisions to credit-constrained private entrepreneurs, and promotion of interregional capital 
mobility. Huang (2003) argues that one should ask why domestic firms cannot supply the same 
functions. China’s partial reforms, while successful in increasing the scope of the market, have so far 
failed to address many allocative inefficiencies in the Chinese economy".
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or crowding-in effect by the foreign direct investment. Since the data only reports the 
aggregate municipal investment rather than investment at more disaggregated firm 
level, the insignificant coefficient of SE Z dum m y  on domestic investment may reflect 
offsetting effects of crowding-out and crowding-in. In Panel B, Columns (1) to (5), 
under different specifications, indicate that having the SEZ experiment has no sig­
nificant net effect on domestically owned capital stock, which is consistent with the 
pattern in domestic investments32.
1.6  E m pirica l S tep  T hree: SE Z s and  T ota l F actor P r o d u c tiv ity  G row th
1.6.1 Empirical Strategy
Following Young (2003), let gross domestic output be a constant return to scale func­
tion of capital and labor inputs (human capital augmented)
Y  = F ( K , H * L , t )
where the appearance of t , time, as an independent argument denotes the fact that 
the production function evolves over time due to technological progress.
Totally differentiating and dividing by GDP, we find that
d Y  =  ( F j c K . d K  Fh l H L  dHL F\
Y  Y  K  Y  } H L  Y
where Fi represents the partial derivative of F  with respect to argument i. With 
competitive markets, factors are paid their marginal products, so that the terms in 
parentheses on the right-hand side represent the share of each factor in total factor 
payments. Total factor productivity growth, the last term on the right-hand side, rep­
resents the proportional increase in output that would have occurred in the absence of 
any input changes and is calculated as a residual item by subtracting the contribution 
of capital and labor from output growth:
AT F P  AY  „ AK _  , A (H * L)
T F P  Y  k K  ( (H  * L)
*
Caselli (2005) and Young (2003) use growth accounting to calculate total factor 
productivity33. A very important step is to estimate labor shares. The most disag­
gregated GDP data Chinese official statistics provide using the income approach is at
321 also run regressions on total municipal capital stock and find no strong impact of the SEZs. A 
supporting fact will be that the average ratio of foreign direct investment to total municipal investment 
is 0.04 during the sample period (1978-2007). This might explain why we do not observe significant 
increase in total capital stock by the Special Economic Zone experiment. However, I do get strong 
results of the SEZs on foreign owned capital stock.
33Note that esimating TFP based on estimating a production function is heavily exposed to the 
endogeneity problem. All inputs, including capital and labor, are endogeneous decisions, which are 
correlated with the unobserved error term. There is no good instrumented variable for them at the 
municipal level.
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the provincial level.34 In the main regression, I use the provincial capital share as a 
proxy for the municipal capital share. As comparison groups, I also use national cap­
ital share 0k = 0.4 reported in Young (2003) and international benchmark in Caselli 
(2005) 0k = 1/3 as a proxy for municipal capital share.
If we assume each municipality has a time-invariant level of total factor productiv­
ity and its own trend of technology progress, the Special Economic Zone experiment 
changed the trend of its TFP growing path, then
ATFPipt =  Sj +  r  * SEZdummyipt +  A eipt (1.6)
From 1978 to 2007, China also carried out other reforms. To control for common 
macroeconomic events which might influence the growth rate of TFP, I further add 
year fixed effect into the regression, i.e.
A TFPipt = Si + i i  + r * SEZdummyipt +  A£ipt (1.7)
1.6.2 Empirical R esults
In Table 1.8, Column (2 ), with the most rigorous specification (equation 1.7), suggests 
that having a Special Economic Zone status increases total productivity growth by 0.6 
percentage points 35. To compare this contribution with average TFP growth at the 
municipal level, 2.6% during the sample period, SEZs (therefore FDI) have increased 
TFP growth rate by 23%.
The regression results from Column (4) where I use Young’s (2003) national aver­
age capital share 6k — 0.4, and Column (6 ) where I use Caselli’s (2005) international 
benchmark 0k =  1/3, are similar. The fact that the estimates are not sensitive to 
whether I use the provincial average share or national average share mitigates the 
concern that using upper level capital share would cause large measurement error.
1 .7  C onclu sion
By exploiting the extensive establishment of Special Economic Zones in China since 
1979, my paper makes three contributions to our understanding of the impact of spe­
cial economic zones on foreign direct investment and other economic outcomes. Using 
a comprehensive and unique dataset on Chinese municipalities from 1978 to 2007, my 
first contribution is to estimate the effect of Special Economic Zones on attracting 
foreign direct investment. I find that the policy package, including private property 
rights protection, tax breaks and land use policy, increases per capita municipal foreign 
direct investment by 58% in the form of foreign-invested and export-oriented indus­
trial enterprises. While it is possible that Special Economic Zones were deliberately
34 See Hsueh and Li (1999) for 1978-95, NBS (2006) for 1993-2004.
351 have run a placebo test for TFP growth using two dummies indicating one year, two years 
before the SEZ experiment as well as the reform variable, SEZdummy. The coefficients for the two 
pre-reform dummies are not significant, while the coefficient for SE Zdum m y  does not change much.
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allocated to municipalities on the basis of time-varying characteristics unobservable to 
economists today, I find little evidence for this potential source of bias to my results 
using municipality specific trends, matched sample, restricted sample and a placebo 
test. There are also concerns that the effect of SEZs on FDI might be merely a reflec­
tion of diversion effect, i.e. a change of distribution across municipalities. It is ruled 
out by robustness checks at provincial and national level.
My second contribution is to map foreign direct investment by multinational firms 
to municipal macroeconomic outcomes. I find that the Special Economic Zone exper­
iment increased municipal foreign owned capital stock and did not reduce domestic 
capital (and investment).
My third contribution is to check in addition to physical capital, whether Special 
Economic Zones bring more advanced technology, i.e. higher total factor productivity 
growth. I find that the Special Economic Zone experiment increased municipality TFP 
growth by 0.6 percentage points. The results are robust to various capital share prox­
ies. By exploiting a growth accounting framework, my work provides the mechanisms 
of gains from Special Economic Zones: one channel is through increasing physical 
capital stock; the other is via boosting total factor productivity growth.
This paper’s findings pose several questions for future research. First, among the 
incentive package Special Economic Zones provided, what is the elasticity of foreign 
direct investment with respect to property rights protection, tax breaks, land use 
policy and other elements respectively? Micro-level surveys on Special Economic 
Zones can generate promising results on this issue. Second, newly issued data on 
Special Economic Zones also provides good opportunities to test the fiscal impact of 
tax breaks specifically for foreign investors on municipal public good provision. Third, 
further work could be done on evaluating whether the Special Economic Zone policy 
(i.e. subsidies to foreign investors) raise municipal welfare36. Therefore, a cost-benefit 
analysis based on Special Economic Zone policies should be carried out.
36Refer to Gordon H. Hanson (2001). He presents a simple theoretical model for evaluating FDI 
promoting policies in G-24 countries.
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1.8 F ig u re s  a n d  ta b le s
F igure 1.1: SEZs, FDI and Trade Outcome
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Note: the graph displays the significant correlation between the SEZ experiment and FDI outcome 
in China.
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Figure 1.2: Geographic Evolution of Special Economic Zone Experiment
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Note: if a whole municipality was granted the status of Open Special Economic Zone; or within 
the municipality, only a certain geographical area was granted to establish state-level economic zones, 
or province-level economic zones, the municipality was entitled to use preferential policy (including 
property rights protection, tax break, cheaper land bill, etc.) to attract foreign direct investment. 
Therefore, I define the municipality to be a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) from a general prospective.
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F ig u re  1.3: Difference-In-Difference Graph of SEZ on FDI outcome
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Note: we classify 326 municipalities into four groups based on their timing of carrying out the 
Special Economic Zone experiment. Group 1 is composed of municipalities which were exposed to 
the SEZ reform in the early 1980s (1980-1985); Group 2 is composed of municipalities which had the 
SEZ experiment in the late 1980s (1986-1990); Group 3 is composed of municipalities which had been 
granted the SEZ experiment in the early 1990s (1991-1995); Group 4 includes municipalities which 
had the SEZ reform since the late 1990s. The graph displays the sample mean of per capita FDI by 
year by group without controlling for any municipal characteristics and macroeconomic shocks.
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Figure 1.4: SEZs and Provincial FDI
P ro p o r tio n  o f  M u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ith  SEZs by  p ro v in ce
r i -mI •**« :oci id m* zed Vi u l  ^**1 a x i  ' i r t  - m  *•*« » o i  '« « ■ ’*•4 rooA
J
,-cci
L n(per c a p ita  P rov incial FDI)
Note: the graph illustrates the proportion of municipalities with SEZs in each province and Ln(per 
capita provincial FDI). This is to address the concern that the FDI SEZs attract at the municipal 
level comes from the diversion effect, i.e. redistribution of FDI across municipalities that have SEZs 
and those have no SEZs (within the same province). There is a strong positive correlation between the 
proportion of municipalities with SEZs in the province and per capita provincial FDI, which should 
be null if it is merely a diversion effect.
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Table 1.1: The Granting Sequence of SEZs
Variables 1978 1979-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2007
1. Number of municipalities 
newly granted SEZs 0 30 49 145 76
2. Number of municipalities 
with SEZs 0 30 79 224 300
3. Total Number of 
municipalities 326 326 326 326 326
4. Ratio of municipalities 
with SEZs 0.0 0.09 0.24 0.69 0.92
5. Average Distance 
to the coast _ 0.15 1.34 3.75 6.26
6. Average per capita 
industry output in 1978 _ 806 611 429 263
7. Average per capita
number of secondary students 1978 - 0.064 0.060 0.066 0.057
Notes: based on the timing of granting SEZs, I classify the sample into 4 groups. The distance to the 
nearest coast, unit: 100 miles; Per capita industrial output in 1978, unit: RMB; Per capita enrolled 
secondary school students in 1978, unit: person.
1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 38
T able 1.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variables Number of Beginning of End of
Observations Available data Available data
a. SEZ experiment
Special Economic Zone Index 9778 0.00 0.92
(0.00) (0.27)
b. FDI related outcome
FDI per capita (US dollar) 9755 0.00 82.79
(0.03) (162.38)
Exports per capita (US dollar) 9733 2.34 811.60
(17.59) (2892.22)
FIE industrial output per capita (RMB) 3667 26.16 9930.44
(232.98) (26940.67)
c. Growth accounting data
RealGDP per capita (RMB) 9771 389.16 6467.79
(314.11) (6242.15)
Domestic capital stock per capita 9677 355.96 13691.16
(890.33) (11257.42)
Foreign capital stock per capita 9667 0.00 1295.41
(0.04) (2834.58)
Labor (10,000) 9779 126.2 220.08
(112.95) (174.88)
Average schooling year in 1982 325 5.12
(0.78)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Special Economic Zone index is a dummy variable which 
indicates whether the municipality carried out the SEZ experiment. Detailed construction procedure is 
described in section 1.2.2.
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Table 1.3: Propensity Score Matching: Nearest Neighbor Approach
a. Probit Regression Results
Variable Coefficient (std. error)
Industry output78 0.0006***
(0.0002)
Secondary student78 -3.0710
(3.3481)
Distance -0.0930***
(0.0197)
Log Likelihood -204.11
Pseudo R-squared 0.096
Number of Obs. 326
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant
at 1%. Industry output78 denotes the per capita industrial output in 1978, unit: RMB; Secondary student78 denotes 
per capita enrolled secondary school students in 1978, unit: person; Distance denotes the distance to the nearest coast, 
unit: 100 miles.
b. Comparison Before and After Matching
Variable Sample
Mean Percent
Bias
Reduction 
in |bias|
t-test
Treated Control t p> |t|
Industry output78 Unmatched 565.26 307.43 46.0 4.13 0.000
Matched 565.26 595.22 -5.3 88.4 -0.42 0.672
Secondary student78 Unmatched 0.064 0.060 15.8 1.43 0.153
Matched 0.064 0.065 -3.8 76.0 -0.34 0.734
Distance Unmatched 2.69 5.06 -60.1 -5.44 0.000
Matched 2.69 2.91 -5.7 90.4 -0.64 0.526
Notes: Matched denotes the case after propensity score matching is done; Unmatched denotes the case before propensity 
score matching is done. Treated denotes the group of municipalities which were granted SEZs by 1992; Control denotes 
the group which have not yet carried out the SEZ experiment by 1992.
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T able 1.4: Step One: the SEZ Experiment on FDI Outcome
Panel A Ln(foreign direct investment per capita)
Full Sample Matched Later SEZ
(1) (2) (3) Sample Sample
SEZdummy 0.723*** 0.478*** 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.355***
(0.079) (0.056) (0.053) (0.061) (0.061)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Trend - Yes -
Municipality trend - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9772 9772 9772 7405 7404
R-squared 0.761 0.845 0.891 0.898 0.845
Panel B Ln(exports per capita)
Full Sample Matched Later SEZ
(1) (2) (3) Sample Sample
SEZdummy 0.871*** 0.719*** 0.608*** 0.595*** 0.531***
(0.098) (0.080) (0.082) (0.096) (0.092)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Trend - Yes -
Municipality trend - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9733 9733 9733 7391 7376
R-squared 0.833 0.877 0.922 0.927 0.898
Panel C Ln(Industrial output of foreign invested enterprises per capita)
Full Sample Matched Later SEZ
(1) (2) (3) Sample Sample
SEZdummy 0.307** 0.275** 0.497*** 0.525*** 0.375**
(0.137) (0.124) (0.128) (0.130) (0.184)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Trend - Yes -
Municipality trend - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3667 3667 3667 3055 2604
R-squared 0.906 0.922 0.943 0.946 0.935
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at municipality 
level. *  denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Panel A evalutes the effect 
of the SEZ experim ent on per capita FDI; Panel B exam ines whether the SEZ experim ent promotes trade; 
Panel C checks the industrial output by foreign invested enterprises.
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T able 1.5: Step One: Robustness Check A
Placebo Test
Variable Panel A Panel B Panel C
Ln(per capita FDI) . Ln(per capita exports) Ln(per capita FIE output)
SEZ(-2) -0.00594 0.0395 -0.123
(0.0395) (0.0591) (0.108)
SEZ(-l) 0.0464 0.125* 0.0215
(0.0470) (0.0696) (0.163)
SEZ(-fO) 0.150*** 0.354*** 0.205
(0.0562) (0.0871) (0.210)
SEZ(+1) 0.376*** 0.507*** 0.631***
(0.0678) (0.101) (0.201)
SEZ(+2) 0.445*** 0.630*** 0.466*
(0.0734) (0.112) (0.250)
SEZ(3+) 0.880*** 1.024*** 0.765***
(0.0834) (0.123) (0.254)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9772 9733 3667
R-squared 0.897 0.925 0.944
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at municipality 
level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. SEZ(+n) are dummies 
denoting n years after the SEZ experiment.
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Table 1.6: Step One: Robustness Check B 
Test for Diversion Effect
Panel A Ln(foreign direct investment per capita)
Full Sample Matched Sample Later SEZ Sample
SEZdummy 0.452*** 0.429*** 0.352***
(0.052) (0.060) (0.061)
OtherSEZ -0.271*** -0.319*** -0.141***
(0.043) (0.054) (0.035)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9772 7405 7404
R-squared 0.892 0.899 0.845
Panel B Ln (exports per capita)
Full Sample Matched Sample Later SEZ Sample
SEZdummy 0.600*** 0.591*** 0.529***
(0 .081) (0.095) (0.092)
OtherSEZ -0.255*** -0.278*** -0.089**
(0.047) (0.060) (0.042)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9733 7391 7376
R-squared 0.923 0.927 0.898
Panel C Ln (Industrial output of foreign invested enterprises per capita)
Full Sample Matched Sample Later SEZ Sample
SEZdummy 0.491*** 0.519*** 0.378**
(0.127) (0.129) (0.184)
OtherSEZ -0.630*** -0.747*** -0.248
(0.150) (0.181) (0.159)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3667 3055 2604
R-squared 0.944 0.946 0.935
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at munici­
pality level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Panel A, B , 
C evalute the creation effect and diversion effect o f the SEZ experim ent on per capita FDI, trade and 
industrial output by foreign invested enterprises respectively. The coefficient of SEZdummy captures 
the creation effect. The coefficient o f OtherSEZ dummy variable captures the diversion effect.
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T able 1.7: Step Two: SEZs on Domestically Owned Capital Formation
Panel A Ln(Real Domestic Investment)
(1)
Full Sample 
(2) (3)
Matched
Sample
Later SEZ 
Sample
SEZdummy 0.044 -0.048 0.067** 0.087** -0.017
(0.044) (0.039) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Trend - Yes - - -
Municipality trend - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9732 9732 9732 7364 7399
R-squared 0.931 0.942 0.960 0.961 0.960
Panel B Ln(Real Domestically Owned Capital Stock)
(1)
Full Sample 
(2) (3)
Matched
Sample
Later SEZ 
Sample
SEZdummy
0.027 0.012 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.023
(0.038)) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Trend - Yes - - -
Municipality trend - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9669 9669 9669 7301 7379
R-squared 0.958 0.967 0.986 0.986 0.986
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at municipality 
level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Panel A checks the effect 
of the SEZ experim ent on domestically owned investment; Panel B checks the effect o f the SEZ experiment 
on dom estically owned capital stock.
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Table 1.8: Step Three: SEZs on TFP Growth
TFP Growth
K share=provincial average K share=national average K share=l/3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SEZdummy 0.035*** 0.006** 0.034*** 0.006* 0.035*** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440
R-squared 0.071 0.132 0.072 0.132 0.074 0.136
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at municipality 
level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. In column (1) and (2), 
I use the most disaggregate capital share available, i.e. province level average capital share; in column (3) 
and (4), I use Young’s (2003) national average capital share; in column (5) and (6), I use the international 
benchmark capital share as in Caselli (2005).
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A D ata A ppendix
This appendix provides information (supplementary to that in section 1.2.2) on the 
variables used in this paper.
Sam ple of M unicipalities:
The dataset includes 326 municipalities of 31 provinces in China. I combine Fuyang 
and Bozhou in Anhui Province to be one municipality, and Baicheng and Songyuan 
to be one municipality due to statistical availability. I omit Laibin and Chongzuo 
of Guangxi Province since they were only established in the early 2000s. Due to 
statistical availability, I treat Tibet as a big municipality.
G overnm ent O rganization Structure in China, 2005
4 P ro v in c ia l- lev e l m u n ic ip a litie s : 
B eijin g , S h a n g h a i, T ia n j in ,  C h o n g q in g  
(A v e ra g e  p o p : 17 .9  m illion)
22 p ro v in c e s  &  5 a u to n o m o u s  re g io n s  
(A v e ra g e  p o p : 45 .7  m illion)
Central government 
(Pop: 1.31 billion)
L o w e r  level g o v e rn m e n ts
333 municipality units 
Average pop: 3.71 million
S tatistica l Source:
1. 30th anniversary of opening up Reform statistical books 1978-2008 (Beijing, 
Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Neimeng, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan and 
Tianjin).
2. 50th anniversary of People’s Republic of China (1949-1999) statistical yearbooks 
(Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, 
Jiangxi, Liaoning, Neimeng, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Zhe­
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jiang Province).
3. Province statistical yearbooks (1980s,1990s,2000s).
4. China city statistical yearbooks (1985-2008).
5. China city 50 years (1949-1999).
6 . China regional statistical yearbooks (2000-2008).
7. China custom statistics (1994-2008).
8 . Municipal statistical bureau website.
9. Tien-Tung Hsueh and Qiang Li (eds.) (1999), China’s National Income: 1952- 
1995.
10. National Statistical Bureau, Data of Gross Domestic Product of China (1952- 
2004).
Growth A ccounting Variable:
1 . Deflator for GDP and Investment: Municipal GDP (investment) deflator
The statistical office of most countries estimate real GDP by deflating nominal 
GDP using separate, independently constructed, price indices. However, this is 
not the procedure in China. Local statistical bureaus are called on to report 
the value of GDP in current and constant (base year) prices. The difference 
between the two series produces an implicit deflator, which is then used to deflate 
nominal value added. Based on GDP at current price and the GDP index at 
constant price (GDP index at 1978=100), I calculate the GDP deflator for most 
municipalities. For a few municipalities located in Gansu, Anhui, Shaanxi, Jilin 
and Liaoning Province whose municipal GDP indices are not available, I use the 
provincial GDP deflator as a proxy. This municipal deflator is for the first time 
applied to growth accounting work in China’s studies and avoid measurement 
error by using the provincial deflator.
2. Real Physical Capital Stock
This is calculated based on the investment, investment deflator, depreciation rate 
and average geometric growth rate of investment. Following Caselli (2005),Caselli 
(2007) and Young (2003), the routine of calculating initial capital stock K q is 
Io/(delta  +  g) , Here, I use the initial investment in 1978 as Iq, because complete 
investment series before 1978 are not available for most municipalities; Provin­
cial 50 years’ statistics only reported investment data in 1952, 1962, 1970 and 
1975, which make imputing initial capital from 1952 inaccurate, delta is the 
depreciation rate set at 0.06, g is average geometric growth rate of investment
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between 1950s and 1978 for municipalities whose pre-1978 investment data are 
available, or the average geometric growth rate of investment between 1978 and 
1980 for municipalities whose pre-1978 investment data are not available. Based 
on initial capital stock, investment series and GDP deflator, I get real capital 
stock in later years Kt using Kt = K t- 1 * (1 — delta) -I- It/defla tor.
3. Labor and Human Capital
Labor (L ): employment in the municipality, including corporate and non-corporate 
sector.
Human capital (H ): Based on the Chinese Population Census 1982 and Young 
(2003), since the 1982 population census did not include municipal educational 
attainment statistics, I use provincial average years of schooling as proxy for mu­
nicipal educational attainment. Following Hall and Jones (1999), this is turned 
into a measure of human capital in 1982 through the formula:
h =  e ^ 9)
where s is average years of schooling, and the function.
<p(s) is piecewise linear with slope 0.134 for s < 4, 0.101 for 4 -< s <  8 , and
0.068 for 8  -< s. The rationale for this functional form is as follows: given our 
production function, perfect competition in factor and good markets implies 
that the wage of a worker with s years of education is proportional to his human 
capital. Since the wage-schooling relationship is widely thought to be log-linear, 
this calls for a log-linear relation between h and s as well, or something like 
h = e^s*3. Based on population census and survey 1982, 1990, 1995, Young 
(2003) has estimated China’s average LN human capital growth rate to be 0.011 
from 1978-1995. I combine human capital in 1982 (based on population census 
1982) and this growth rate to generate human capital series for all municipalities.
4. Labor and Capital share37
The most disaggregated GDP data Chinese official statistics provided using in­
come approach is at the provincial level. There are four components including 
Compensation of Employees, Net Taxes on Production, Depreciation of Fixed 
Assets and Net Operating Surplus. I can directly measure a  from the data, but I 
need to make some adjustments. I define the labor income share as unambiguous 
labor income divided by GDP net of the ambiguous categories (indirect taxes).
Labor Share =
This procedure is equivalent to splitting the ambiguous categories between labor 
income and capital income in the same proportions as in the rest of the economy.
37Refer to The Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century and Holz (2006).
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The capital share, a , is then 1 - Labor Share. Since the income approach reports 
provincial statistics from 1978, I use the provincial capital share between 1978 
and 2003 to be the capital share. I omit 2004 as there is a big change in the 
statistics on compensation of employees since 2004.
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2 Fiscal Incentive: Testing For 
China’s Sub-national Govern­
ments
2.1  In tro d u ctio n
In the presence of asymmetric information, contracts in organizations, such as firms 
and political institutions, are designed to provide incentives. In recent years, contract 
design and the impact of incentives have been analyzed extensively. While there are 
many empirical studies focused on compensation schemes at the firm level (Bandiera, 
2006) and theoretical research about incentive scheme in public organizations (Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005), fewer empirical studies are about the government.
The purpose of this paper is to study the fiscal compensation scheme between 
China’s sub-national governments and national government. It evaluates the effects of 
fiscal incentives on local government’s fiscal effort and sheds light on how government 
agencies react to incentives under a multi-tasking framework.
To this purpose, I collected a data set that covers twenty-nine provinces from 1980 
to 2005. It contains indices on several budgetary taxes, extra-budgetary revenue, 
local budgetary expenditure, local extra-budgetary expenditure, information on fiscal 
incentive, namely, the marginal sharing rate (the proportion of fiscal revenue local 
governments could keep), as well as fiscal capacity indicators.
Contract theory predicts that in general, if the agent faces two tasks, the optimal 
effort on each task will depend on the sharing rates of both tasks. Changing one task’s 
marginal sharing rate will cause changes to the productivity of both tasks.
From 1980 to 1993, China implemented a fiscal contracting regime. Sub-national 
governments signed fiscal contracts with national government, in which they agreed on 
a local marginal sharing rate38. Marginal sharing rates on budgetary revenue during 
this period exhibited cross province variations: while fourteen provinces had a sharing 
rate smaller than 1 0 0 %, the other fifteen provinces had a sharing rate equal to 1 0 0 %. 
In addition to budgetary tax revenue, there is an extra-budgetary revenue that have 
been allowed to set aside since the early 1980s39. Fees represent the main source for 
the extra-budgetary revenue at the local level. Because the extra-budgetary revenue is 
largely outside of the Ministry of Finance purview, it conferred significant autonomy 
to local governments, implicitly a 100% local sharing rate. In 1994, China’s national
38From 1985 to 1993, the local marginal sharing rate is applied to all industrial-commercial taxes, 
for example, value-added tax, business tax, enterprise income tax that were mainly discussed in this 
paper.
39Fees represent the main source for extra-budgetary revenue at the local level. The list of fees 
includes surcharges on household utility bills, hospitals and school charges, road maintenance, adver­
tising, vehicle purchasing and so on. Some of the fees are levied by individual departments of the local 
administration and kept for the departments’ use without passing through the local general budget.
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government abolished the fiscal contracting regime and initiated a new one called the 
tax separating system. Taxes are classified as local exclusive tax, central exclusive tax 
and shared tax. Therefore, the local sharing rates for different taxes were changed. 
In detail, local marginal sharing rates for value added tax, one of the most important 
taxes in China, decreased to 25% in all provinces; marginal sharing rates for business 
tax and enterprise income tax were set at 100% in all provinces. Therefore, provinces 
with pre-1994 marginal sharing rate less than 100% enjoyed a larger rise in the sharing 
rate for business tax and enterprise income tax, and a smaller fall in the sharing rate 
for value added tax. Provinces with pre-1994 marginal sharing rate equal to 100% 
had no increase in the sharing rate for business tax and enterprise income tax, and 
experienced a larger fall in the sharing rate for value added tax. Along with the changes 
in tax assignments, a major effort was made by the central government to establish its 
own revenue collection agencies - state tax bureaus responsible for collecting central 
and shared taxes. Local tax bureaus are responsible for collecting only local taxes.
My identification strategy combines the introduction of this reform with the cross- 
province differences in pre-reform budgetary sharing rates. Provinces with initially 
lower sharing rates had more to gain from the newly established fiscal regime in the 
budgetary category, whereas provinces with initially higher rates had more to lose. 
This heterogeneity allows for a treatment/control strategy. Moreover, the 1994 tax 
separating reform - which was fully implemented - did not depend on the factors at 
the provincial level. The goal in implementing this reform was to set marginal tax 
sharing rates across provinces at uniform levels40. I argue that it was not related to, 
or somehow catered to, special interest groups, and therefore should not be thought 
of as endogenous in this context.
After the reform, on one hand, in the budgetary category, business tax revenue, 
enterprise income tax revenue and value added tax revenue, all in per capita terms, 
increased markedly in provinces that previously had lower marginal sharing rates. 
This is true in absolute terms as well as relative to provinces that had higher marginal 
sharing rates. On the other hand, in the extra-budgetary revenue category, provinces 
with lower pre-1994 budgetary sharing rates devote less effort to extra-budgetary 
revenue after the reform, relative to provinces with higher pre-1994 marginal sharing 
rates. The results suggest that local governments treat the budgetary tax revenue and 
extra-budgetary revenue as substitutes. When the marginal sharing rate of budgetary 
category increases, local governments will increase their effort in budgetary revenue 
and decrease their effort in extra-budgetary revenue. The effort includes promoting the 
growth of fiscal revenue bases (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; Cai and Treisman, 2006; 
Kung, Xu and Zhou, 2009) and better enforcement (Ma and Norregaard, 1998; Cai and 
Treisman, 2004). Despite the tax policy in China is such that the statutory tax rates 
and bases are set by the central government, local governments have influence or even
40In Jin et al. (2005) pl724, “the post-1994 phase has eliminated the variations of the revenue 
sharing rules from the 1980-1993 phase”.
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direct control rights over a substantial amount of resources within their jurisdiction, 
including regional firms, land, financial resources, energy, raw materials, and others 
(Xu, 2010). Being deeply involved in the regional economies, local governments could 
therefore effectively influence the tax revenue not only through better enforcement 
(by local tax officials to tackle tax evasion), but also through promoting the growth of 
tax bases. Therefore, in later empirical exercise, tax-rate and tax-base measures are 
not controlled for and should be included in the estimated effect.
A big concern about my empirical strategy is the non-random pre-reform marginal 
sharing rates. It is true that the particularistic contracted sharing rates before 1994 
across provinces are not exogenous. Generally, richer coastal provinces were offered 
lower marginal sharing rates. In later regressions, I include per capita GDP, the 
number of special economic zones and per capita loans of financial institutions to 
take care of the possibility that provinces with lower pre-reform marginal sharing 
rates generate more budgetary revenue after the reform just because they are richer, 
or because their sectoral composition is more business friendly to generate tax, or 
because their financial development is easier to observe business transactions and 
thus to collect taxes. These control variables prevent my result from being driven by 
fiscal capacity, sectoral structure or financial development rather than more tax effort.
My analysis demonstrates the importance of taking cross-task substitution41 into 
account when estimating the impact of policy reforms, such as the 1994 tax separating 
reform, that alter the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The analysis 
provides a strong implication that the impacts of such reforms are not limited only 
to the task to which they are directly addressed: their effects may spill over to other 
tasks of sub-national governments.
There are of course disadvantages regarding my estimates, in particular, for value 
added tax. Since the 1994 reform did more than changing sharing rates. In particular, 
as local sharing rate for VAT was reduced, provincial governments also lost the au­
thority to collect VAT themselves. A new State Tax Bureau was established to collect 
central and shared taxes. It suggests that the central government was aware of the 
potential agency problem, and thus questions the interpretation of the estimates as 
measuring the pure effect of marginal incentives on local effort. This is because the 
reform changed the basic structure of the agency problem, and essentially tried to re­
move the agency aspect of the revenue collection that experienced a lower pre-existing 
local sharing rate. Even if the changed collection system is uniformly implemented, 
the establishment of central collection agencies (State Tax Bureaus) may have hetero­
geneous effects across provinces depending on their pre-reform sharing rates. Ceteris 
paribus, this part of the reform is likely to increase revenue in the group of provinces 
with low initial sharing rates (and hence poor collection incentives) relative to the
41 Not unlike my analysis of the effect of the Chinese tax separating reform on the revenue shares 
of different taxes, Marton and Wildasin (2007) examined the cross-program subsitution effect of the 
1996 welfare reform on the budget shares of Medicaid and welfare spending in US with a theoretical 
model. However, their analysis focused on the theoretical aspect.
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provinces with high initial sharing rates (and hence strong collection incentives). Due 
to the feature of the reform, the interpretation of the coefficient of VAT may include 
1) the effect of the newly established State Tax Bureau; 2) the effect of the sharing 
rate change on local effort to promote relevant tax base.
The incentives in China’s sub-national governments have been discussed mainly 
in two strands of literature. One concerns how political incentive induces provincial 
leaders to promote economic performance (Li (1998), Qian and Xu (1999), Qian, 
Roland and Xu (2006), Li and Zhou (2004)). The other line looks at the relationship 
between fiscal incentive and economic development such as Zhang and Zou (1998), 
Zhang and Gong (2005), Lin and Liu (2000), Jin and Qian (2005), Yao (2005)42. 
Their work tried to argue that a higher local stake in fiscal revenue motivated local 
governments to promote economic growth. However, the identification strategies are 
exposed to the endogeneity problem as many factors contribute to economic growth in 
addition to the fiscal issue. It is very likely that the fiscal incentive captures the effect 
of other reform measures. Kung et al. (2009) moved a step further by investigating 
the link between the powerful fiscal incentive change and local government’s behavior 
of promoting relevant tax bases43. However, as discussed above, no paper has yet 
investigated local government’s effort in the budgetary and extra-budgetary revenue 
corresponding to the fiscal incentive. My work is the first trial to explore this aspect, 
with a stronger identification strategy in the sense that the link between the marginal 
sharing rate local governments faced and the fiscal revenue they generated is more 
robust.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly reviews the 
fiscal reform; Section 2.3 provides a simple theoretical model that generates predictions 
for the effects of marginal sharing rates change on local government’s budgetary tax 
effort and extra-budgetary revenue effort; Section 2.4 describes the data and identifi­
cation strategy; Section 2.5 illustrates the analysis of the budgetary category; Section
2.6 presents the extra-budgetary category; Section 2.7 concludes.
42Zhang and Zou (1998), using provincial panel data from 1980 to 1993, suggest that during the 
fiscal contracting period, fiscal decentralization denoted as the increasing trend in the ratio of local 
expenditure to central expenditure, has negative effect on growth. Zhang and Gong (2005) follow 
a similar procedure, extending the time series to include the 1994 tax separating reform. They get 
consistent results that fiscal decentralization between 1985 and 1993 is negatively correlated with 
growth while fiscal decentralization between 1994 and 2004 is positively correlated with growth. The 
problem with their work is the endogeneity of fiscal incentive index, as it is highly correlated with 
provincial characteristics. Lin and Liu (2000) used marginal sharing rate as the indicator for fiscal 
incentive, and obtained a positive result of fiscal decentralization on growth. Jin and Qian (2005) 
explored the 1985-1993 fiscal contracting reform in more detail and also got a positive relationship 
between fiscal incentive and regional economic development. Yao (2005) discussed local fiscal incentive 
within the inter-government grant framework. He argued that the current grant system has highly 
equalizing effect towards poor areas; also, his results reveal an economically significant crowding-out 
effect of equalization grants, indicating that the grant seeking incentives, which reduce local revenues, 
can undermine the economic efficiency of current grant policies.
43Kung et al (2009) argued that fiscal stimulus throughout 1994 tax separating reform induced local 
governments to switch their development focus from industrializing their jurisdictions to urbanizing 
them, as articulated in the eventual demise of Town and Village Enterprises after its phenomenal rise, 
followed by the boom (and recently bust) of a real estate sector in recent years.
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2.2  F isca l R eform  R ev iew
China’s administrative system has five hierarchical levels of government: (1) central; 
(2 ) provincial; (3) municipal; (4) county and (5) township (Figure 2 .1 ). In this paper 
I focus on the provincial level. It is the exact level where the 1994 fiscal reform 
was carried out and the identification variations come from. W ith respect to the tax 
practices in China, the central government determines the statutory rates and bases, 
but tax collection and significant spending are performed at the provincial and lower 
level. Moreover, local governments deeply participate into the regional economies and 
have enough resources to influence the fiscal revenue not only through enforcement 
(by local tax officials to tackle tax evasion), but also via promoting the growth of tax 
bases.
2.2.1 1980-1993 Fiscal Contracting Stage
In the early 1980s44, China began its so-called transitional period. It changed its price 
system to dual-track, i.e. market price and planned price coexisted at the same time, 
as well as initiated modest reform in state-owned enterprises (SOE) by introducing 
management and payment incentives. These reforms diluted the central government’s 
monitoring ability over local governments’ tax collection effort, as the real economy 
became more complicated than the purely central planned regime. Therefore, the 
central government decided to endow more fiscal power to local governments, in order 
to encourage them to cooperate with ongoing reforms and collect more taxes. In 1982, 
China started its fiscal contracting trial. The budgetary fiscal revenue is classified as 
central fixed, local fixed and adjustable income45. Local governments are allowed to 
keep part of the local revenue (local fixed and adjustable income). It was considered as 
a big movement compared to the former centralized fiscal system. However, the local 
revenue was small compared with central revenue part. Also, the initial trial was short­
lived and changed frequently across the year. Actually, the system has become more 
favorable and stable for local governments since 1985 with local governments enjoying 
higher marginal sharing rates and also a larger local revenue base46. From 1985 to 
1987, and 1988 to 1993, long term fiscal contracts were reached between the central 
and local governments. Many provinces (fifteen out of twenty-nine in the sample),
44 Before the 1980s, China’s fiscal system was highly centralized. Local governments acted as the 
collecting and spending agents for the central government. All revenue and expenditure were allocated 
by the central government, according to its fiscal year plan. Thus, the highly redistributed system 
was described vividly as “eating from the same stove” (Da Guo Fan). This unitary fiscal system 
relied heavily on China’s whole economic system. During that time, China’s national economy was 
dominated by state owned enterprises (SOE). Tax revenue was highly concentrated in the SOE sector 
guaranteed by the planned price system. This made taxes easy to collect and local tax efforts easy to 
monitor. As a result, the fiscal system functioned well before 1980s.
45For detailed revenue assignment and sharing rule details, refer to Appendix A and B.
4 6 The fiscal contracts provided strong incentives for local governments to develop the non-state 
sector, of which township and village enterprises was a key component (Qian and Xu, 1993; Jin, 
Qian and Weingast, 2005). Since the mid-1980s, TVEs had been the main contributor to local taxes 
(mainly VAT) on which they enjoy high marginal sharing rates (Wong and Bird 2008).
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generally inland poorer ones, enjoyed a 1 0 0 % marginal sharing rate in major taxes 
such as value added tax, a turnover tax on the production of goods; business tax, a 
turnover tax covering most services; and enterprise income tax applied to businesses47. 
Other provinces, mainly rich coastal ones, had marginal sharing rates less than 100%. 
In Figure 2.2, light-shaded areas are provinces with pre-1994 100% marginal sharing 
rates; grey-shaded areas are provinces with pre-1994 lower marginal sharing rates.
For local governments, in addition to budgetary revenue, there is an extra-budgetary 
revenue that they were allowed to set aside since the early 1980s. Fees represent the 
main source for the extra-budgetary revenue at the local level. The list of fees includes 
surcharges on household utility bills, hospitals and school charges, road maintenance, 
advertising, vehicle purchasing and so on. Because the extra-budgetary revenue is 
largely outside of the MOF (the Ministry of Finance) purview, it conferred very sig­
nificant real autonomy to local governments, implicitly 1 0 0 % local sharing rate, and 
provides a local revenue base. Most importantly, it was widely accepted as a legitimate 
source for “topping up” local public expenditures48.
2.2.2 1994-2004 Tax Separating System
As local governments got a significant amount of fiscal revenue via fiscal contract­
ing, the central government lost its dominant control over the whole fiscal system. 
According to National Statistical Bureau (1999), the ratio of central budgetary/total 
budgetary revenue declined to 2 2 % by 1993. Some serious distortions occurred due 
to increasing fiscal incentives, such as local protectionism, local collusion with en­
terprises in tax evasion, increasing regional disparity and expanding extra-budgetary 
revenue. The Ministry of Finance decided to adopt a tax separating system in 1994 
to strengthen the central government’s control over the fiscal regime. It reversed the 
situation between central and local government in two aspects.
Firstly, Revenue assignment between the central and local governments. The fiscal 
contracting system was abolished. Fiscal revenue was reclassified as central exclusive 
tax (local sharing rate 0 %), local exclusive tax (local sharing rate 1 0 0 %), and shared 
tax (local sharing rate between 0% and 100%). The central government created a new 
consumption tax (central sharing rate 1 0 0 %) and also adjusted the share over several 
important tax categories. For example, the local sharing rate of VAT (value added 
tax), the major tax in China, decreased to 25% for all provinces after the reform. As a 
compensation for the loss in VAT, the local sharing rate of business tax and enterprise
47Enterprise income tax for local governments is from locally owned SOEs, collective enterprises.
48 Due to the increasing size in extra budgetary revenue which is outside the central regulation, 
in 1993, the central government cut the items listed as extra-budgetary revenue. Reform of extra- 
budgetary funds again had begun in 1996 and intensified in 1998 and 1999. Since 1998, the MOF has 
continued a policy of converting fees into taxes with the objective of reducing the importance of extra- 
budgetary funds at the local level. In 1999, the MOF began to formulate organizational budgets that 
show all budgetary, extra-budgetary and other resources and spending for each ministry. In 2000, the 
Minister of Finance, Xiang Huaicheng, announced plans for treasury reform to improve the financial 
management of public funds, and introduction of new standards for government procurement.
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income tax was set to be 1 0 0 % in all provinces.
Secondly, Tax administration. The 1994 reform established a national tax admin­
istration in China for the first time. The previous local tax bureaus were split into two 
distinct offices: state tax bureaus responsible for collecting central and shared taxes, 
and local tax bureaus responsible for collecting local taxes.
Because of the newly adopted tax separating system49, the central share of to­
tal budgetary revenue increased to around 55% in 1994 (National statistical Bureau, 
2004). However, local governments continue to use extra-budgetary revenue as a way 
to avoid central government restriction on the use of these funds. Essentially, local 
sharing rate of extra-budgetary revenue is still 1 0 0 %.
To sum up, between 1985 and 1993, budgetary sharing rates exhibited cross- 
province variations. Fourteen provinces50, had average marginal sharing rates less 
than 100%; the other fifteen provinces51 all had 100% marginal sharing rates. In the 
1994 reform, for value added tax, these fourteen provinces had a smaller drop in the 
marginal sharing rate compared to the other fifteen provinces, who had decreased from 
100% pre-1994 to 25%. For business tax and enterprise income tax, these fourteen 
provinces had a larger increase in the marginal sharing rate, compared to the fifteen 
provinces which already enjoyed a 100% sharing rate pre-1994. Overall, through the 
1994 tax separating reform, the provinces with lower pre-94 budgetary sharing rate 
gained more and lost less in budgetary category compared to those with higher pre­
existing budgetary rates. Appendix D provides profiles for the local marginal sharing 
rate of value added tax, business tax, enterprise income tax and extra-budgetary rev­
enue from 1985 to 2004.
2 .3  F isca l In cen tive  and  Effort: A  T h eo retica l M o d el
The relationship between Chinese central government and local governments could be 
depicted by a classical principal-agent model. Local governments are offered a certain 
share of their output (fiscal revenue in this case). Such performance related pay aligns 
the agent’s (local government) interests with the principal’s (the central government). 
China’s local governments have higher incentives to generate more revenue if they 
are offered more, as they could spend more in local expenditures. The more they 
spend, especially in capital constructions like infrastructure investment, the more 
growth they could inspire and the better political career the provincial leaders could
49The tax separating system cut incentives for promoting local industry especially TVEs by reducing 
local ‘ownership’ of VAT (Kung, Xu and Zhou, 2009). However, there is significant increase in business 
tax receipts, which partly reflects the incentive of local governments to promote the service sector, as 
the proceeds of this tax have accrued 100 percent to local governments since 1994. Also, the separation 
of administration of central and local taxes greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of local governments 
to collect revenues.
50In detail, they are Anhui, Beijing, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Zhejiang.
51 In detail, they are Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Yunnan.
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enjoy (Xu 2009). Therefore, the higher marginal sharing rate offered to provincial 
governments is mapped into the higher utility provincial politicians get.
Suppose the local government has two tasks, also assume that the local government 
is maximizing the following objective function.
7 1 = 2
m ax y S i R i f a ) -  C i(ei,e2) -  C2{e\,e2) +  Tei ,e2 ^i=l
where S i is the local marginal sharing rate on task i, i = 1 , 2 ; e\ and e2 are 
local efforts including enforcement and promoting the growth of relevant tax base on 
task 1 and 2; /2i(ei) and R 2(e2) are fiscal revenue from task 1 and 2; C i(ei,e2 ) and 
C2 (ei,e2 ) are cost functions for task 1 and 2; T  is net lump sum transfer from the 
central government. For simplicity, further assume that
R i ( e i )  =  e\
# 2 (^2 ) =  e2
1 1
Ci(e i,e2) =  -e?  +  - 7 eie2
+  ~7^i^2
where 7  describes the relationship between task 1 and task 2 , 0  <  7  <  1 being 
substitutes. Optimal efforts could be found by FOC:
* 5 i -  7 s2 * s2 -  7S1
1 2 > ^2 — 1 21 — 7Z 1 — 7 ^
Proposition 1 I f  task 1 and 2 are substitutes (0 < 7 < 1), given s2 constant, when 
the marginal sharing rate of task 1, s i, increases, the agent’s effort on task 1, e\ will 
increase, while the effort on task 2, e2 will decrease; when the marginal sharing rate 
of task 1, s i, decreases, the agent’s effort on task 1, e\ will decrease, while the effort 
on task 2, e2 will increase.
Therefore, with regard to China’s tax separating reform in 1994, I have the fol­
lowing prediction: provinces with a lower pre-1994 sharing rate of budgetary revenue 
(mainly composed of tax revenue such as value added tax, business tax and enterprise 
income tax) had a larger increase in the sharing rate, and thus had a relatively bigger 
increase in the budgetary revenue, compared to those with a higher marginal shar­
ing rate pre-reform; also, they had a relatively larger decrease in the extra-budgetary 
revenue after 1994.
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2 .4  D a ta  an d  Id en tifica tion  S tra tegy
2.4.1 D ata
In this paper, I use panel data for twenty-nine provinces from 1980 to 2005. Tibet is 
dropped from the dataset due to the poor quality of its fiscal data52. Chongqing, a 
newly established municipal city since 1997, is not included in the dataset, as it did 
not go through the 1994 tax separating reform53. In my paper, I use the marginal 
sharing rate of budgetary taxes54 as the index for fiscal incentive.
Variables that would be used in the regression axe classified as follows:
I. Local tax revenue indices55 including value added tax, business tax and enter­
prise income tax;
II. Local extra-budgetary revenue;
III. Local budgetary expenditure and extra-budgetary expenditure;
IV. Local fiscal incentive indices including marginal sharing rates of value added 
tax, business tax and enterprise income tax;
V. Local economic control variables including GDP, State-level Economic Zones 
and loans of financial institutions;
VI. Local political control variable: political ties with the central government.
2.4.2 Identification Strategy
The first factor for identifying the impact of the 1994 tax separating reform is that 
different provinces have distinct pre-1994 budgetary sharing rates. All twenty-nine 
provinces experienced this reform. Using the marginal sharing rates at the provincial 
level in a regression yields the following formulas:
Yu — 1 x prel994 sharing ratea — 25%
Zn — —1 x prel994 sharing ratea +  100%
52 In some years, the tax revenue is negative. In some years, data are missing.
53The fiscal statistics for Sichuan before 1997 have excluded Chongqing. So, data are comparable 
before and after 1997.
54 In China’s fiscal reform literature, there are mainly two kinds of fiscal incentive indices. One is 
marginal sharing rate, by Lin and Liu (2000), Jin and Qian (2005), which describes local reward for 
their efforts at the margin, while the other is the ratio of local expenditure/central expenditure in a 
province, by Zhang and Zou (1998), Gong and Zhang (2005). They argued that this ratio, commonly 
used in the literature on fiscal federalism, captured well the magnitude of fiscal decentralization, thus 
was an appropriate index for fiscal incentive. However, China’s statistical data does not provide 
central expenditure at the provincial level. Instead, what they have is only central expenditure in the 
national level. Then, for the same year, given same denominator, the higher local expenditure, the
higher the ratio, and therefore the higher the fiscal incentive in a province. The ratio is very likely
to be endogenous, as local expenditure is highly correlated with other local characteristics, such as 
GDP, population, etc. Provinces like Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang have much higher expenditures than 
provinces like Ningxia, Xinjiang. But on margins, they are only allowed to keep part of local revenue 
for their tax effort, while the latter ones could keep 100%.
55The original statistics of value-added tax revenue since 1994 and enterprise income tax revenue 
since 2002 do not take into account the part handing over to the central government. For my use, I 
have transformed them into total tax revenue generated in every province. I discuss data processing 
procedure in more detail in Appendix C.
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where Yu is the decrease in the marginal sharing rate of value added tax;
Zu is the increase in the marginal sharing rate of of business tax and enterprise 
income tax.
Broadly, this means that the provinces with low (pre-existing) sharing rates were 
in a position to benefit more from the newly established fiscal regime, whereas areas 
with high prevalence were not. This heterogeneity allows for a treatment-control 
strategy. Secondly, the initiation of the 1994 reform was largely a function of factors 
external to the province. It imposes homogenous marginal sharing rates for all sub­
national governments, as well as establishing the State Tax bureau and the Local Tax 
Bureau in all provinces. This contrasts with explanations that might have troublesome 
endogeneity problems, such as capture by special interests.
These factors combine to form the central variable in the present study:
sharing rate^re x post9At
where i indicates the province, sharing r a t e denotes the average level of the 
marginal sharing rate in province i before the reform, post9At is a dummy variable 
indicating whether year t is after the 1994 tax separating reform. I compare the evo­
lution of outcomes (tax revenue per capita) across provinces with distinct pre-reform 
marginal sharing rates, in order to assess the effect of the reform to the remarkable 
changes.
A big concern about my identification validity is the non-random pre-reform mar­
ginal sharing rates. It is true that the particularistic contracted sharing rates before 
1994 across provinces are not exogenous. Generally, richer coastal provinces were 
offered lower marginal sharing rates. Using the interaction term sharing rate^re x 
post94t, I allow a break from 1994, as there is no obvious reason to justify why we ob­
serve the revenue to increase more in richer provinces immediately after 1994 except for 
the different change in marginal sharing rates. More importantly, in later regressions, 
I also include per capita GDP56, the number of state-level special economic zones and 
per capita loans of financial institutions to take care of the possibility that provinces 
with lower pre-reform marginal sharing rates generate more budgetary revenue after 
the reform just because they are richer, or because their sectoral composition is more 
business friendly to generate tax revenue, or because their financial development is 
easier to observe business transactions and thus to collect taxes. Since the tax rev­
enue is in fact partly driven by provincial governments’ effort to promote the growth 
of relevant tax bases57 under the Chinese fiscal system, the tax base is not controlled 
for in the regressions and should therefore be included in the estimated effect.
561 did not put per capita tax base as control variable for the reason that tax base would be highly 
endogenized with respect to marginal sharing rate.
57The unique ability of Chinese local governments to promote the growth of tax bases despite the 
fact that they do not have tax autonomy (setting statutory rates and bases is the authority of the 
central government) is documented in a large literature, including Qian and Xu, 1993; Jin, Qian and 
Weingast, 2005; Cai and Treisman, 2006; Wong and Bird 2008; Kung, Xu and Zhou, 2009.
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2 .5  B u d g eta ry  R even u e
2.5.1 Difference in Difference Analysis
W ithout taking into account heterogeneous starting levels of provinces whose aver­
age pre-1994 marginal sharing rate was smaller than 100%, I first conduct a simple 
difference in difference analysis.
I split twenty-nine provinces in the sample into two groups according to their pre- 
1994 marginal sharing rate. Group A (pre-1994 sharing rate <100%) contains fourteen 
provinces. Group B (pre-1994 sharing rate =100%) contains fifteen provinces. I also 
divided the time series from 1985 to 200458 into two parts, one is from 1985 to 1993; 
the other is from 1994 to 2004, using 1994 as a threshold.
From Table 2.1, we can see Group A, which has a larger increase in the sharing 
rates of business tax and enterprise income tax, and a smaller decrease in the sharing 
rates of value added tax, indeed exhibits larger increase in tax revenue. It is consistent 
with section 2.3’s predictions. From the graphs (Appendix E), similar results hold. In 
general, group A shows more increase than group B. Of course, without taking into 
account other province specific control variables, the analysis is rough. However, it 
does provide us with a preliminary idea that the 1994 reform has different effects on 
different groups.
2.5.2 Econom etric Specification
In order to capture the effect of distinct pre-existing marginal sharing rates on tax 
effort after the 1994 reform, I use the following specifications59.
Taxit = on +  /3t +  7 (.sharing rate^Te x post94t) +  X it5 +  ea (2 .1)
Where T axu are log of various tax revenue in province i at time t.
There are three tax indices I used
1 ) per capita value added tax;
2 ) per capita business tax;
3) per capita enterprise income tax.
ai is the province fixed effect, which controls for the influence of unobserved time- 
invariant province characteristics (e.g. location, natural endowment) on tax revenue. 
f3t will capture the effects of national events which affect all provinces in a similar 
manner. It is the strongest specification in terms of time variable; however, it does 
not allow me to identify the 1994 reform’s level effect clearly, sharing r a t e is the 
weighted average of the sharing rates prevailing pre-1994 in province i. post9A.t is the 
year dummy which denotes the 1994 reform. It switches from 0 to 1 for all provinces
58For budgetary tax revenue, well kept data starts from 1985.
59The specification is similiar to Bleakley, H.(2006) as well as Edmonds et al (2008). I did not put 
sharing rate?reas an indicator in regression as it is correlated with province fixed effect.
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since 1994. X u  contain control variables, i.e. per capita GDP, which captures the 
fiscal capacity in province i at year t. £u is the provincial error term. The coefficient 
of the interaction term (sharing r a t ^ e x post94t), 7 , will capture the effect of the 
pre-reform budgetary sharing rate level on the after reform tax output.
Taxn = ai + 6 x post94t +  0 x trendt +  0(post94* x trendt)
+ 7 {sharing r a t^ re x  post94t) +  x'it5 +  eu (2.2)
Compared with equation (2 .1 ), the difference in specification mainly comes from the 
time variable. In equation (2.2), I specify trendt as the existing time trend. In this 
setting, the coefficient of the reform dummy, 0 , will capture the level effect of the 
1994 reform over and above the existing trend. The coefficient of the time, 0, will 
capture the trend since 1985 if there is any. The coefficient of the interaction term 
post94t x trendt, 0, will capture the effect of the 1994 reform on the change of the 
trend if there is any. The coefficient, 7 , will capture the effect of the pre-reform sharing 
rate level on the after reform tax output.
In addition to the endogeneity problem, there are two issues that might bias our 
results. One is that poorer provinces might have had more transfers from the cen­
tral government since 1994 (a main reason the central government persuaded local 
governments to implement the 1994 reform), which might discourage their collection 
effort. Equivalently, the responses I get might be to the transfer policy rather than 
the change of budgetary sharing rates. However, according to Zhang and Martinez
(2003), from 1994 to 2000, the equalization grant to poorer provinces was around 10% 
out of total transfers from the central government to local governments. Therefore, 
this concern would not bias the regression results significantly.
The other concern is that in addition to the tax sharing rate change, the collect­
ing system also changed. Local exclusive taxes including business tax and enterprise 
income tax are collected by local tax bureaus, which are essentially under the leader­
ship of provincial governments. Here, the post-94 dummy will capture the common 
shock to all provinces, including the local tax bureau establishment which was the 
same across all provinces in 1994. As a result, the coefficient of the interaction term, 
sharing r a t e x post94t , will provide us with clean effect of the 1994 rate change 
depending on a different pre-1994 marginal sharing rate level, for business tax and 
enterprise income tax. However, there are disadvantages regarding my estimates, in 
particular, for value added tax. Since the 1994 reform did more than changing sharing 
rates. As local sharing rate for VAT was reduced, provincial governments also lost 
the authority to collect VAT themselves. A new State Tax Bureau was established to 
collect central and shared taxes. It suggests that the central government was aware of 
the potential agency problem, and thus questions the interpretation of my estimates 
as measuring the pure effect of marginal incentives on local effort. This is because the 
reform changed the basic structure of the agency problem, and essentially tried to re­
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move the agency aspect of the revenue collection that experienced a lower pre-existing 
local sharing rate. Even if the changed collection system is uniformly implemented, 
the establishment of central collection agencies (State Tax Bureaus) may have hetero­
geneous effects across provinces depending on their pre-reform sharing rates. Ceteris 
paribus, this part of the reform is likely to increase revenue in the group of provinces 
with low initial sharing rates (and hence poor collection incentives) relative to the 
provinces with high initial sharing rates (and hence strong collection incentives). Due 
to the combined features of the reform, the interpretation of the coefficient of VAT 
may include 1) the effect of the newly established State Tax Bureau; 2) the effect of 
the sharing rate change on local effect to promote relevant tax base.
2.5.3 R esu lts
Table 2 .2  reports the estimates of provincial per capita value added tax, business 
tax and enterprise income tax regression with respect to equation (2 .1 ) and (2 .2 ) 
respectively. In two specifications, the interaction term, sharing r a t ^ re x post94f, 
always has a significant and negative coefficient, which supports my hypothesis that 
provinces with a lower starting level benefited more in the 1994 reform, and thus 
exhibit higher tax effort on budgetary taxes afterwards. In detail, in per capita terms, 
for value added tax, in Columns (1 ) and (2 ) provinces with a 0% pre-1994 marginal 
sharing rate increase by 27% after 1994 compared to those with a 100% pre-reform 
sharing rate. For business tax, in Columns (3) and (4), provinces with a 0% pre-1994 
marginal sharing rate increase by 30% after 1994 compared to provinces with a 100% 
pre-reform sharing rate. For enterprise income tax, in Column (5), provinces with a 
0% pre-1994 marginal sharing rate increase by 32% after 1994 compared to provinces 
with a 1 0 0 % pre-reform sharing rate.
The coefficients for the control variable, per capita GDP, are positive and highly 
significant, showing that provinces with higher fiscal capacity generate more tax rev­
enue. In Columns (2 ), (4) and (6 ), the coefficients of postMt x trendt are positive 
and significant, suggesting that the reform changed the trend of tax collection. The 
channel is likely to be through the establishment of the State Tax bureau and the 
Local Tax bureau, which have been in charge of collecting budgetary tax since 1994.
2.5.4 R obu stn ess  Check
A d d itio n a l C ontro ls Though in the previous regressions I use per capita GDP to 
control for the fiscal capacity of the province, there are still concerns that provinces 
with lower pre-existing sharing rates generate more tax revenue after 1994 because 
they are more business friendly or their financial development is better for tax bureaus 
to observe transactions and therefore collect revenues. To address these problems, 
I put the number of state-level special economic zones located in province i at t  to 
capture whether the province’s sectoral structure is more export-oriented and business
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friendly60. Moreover, I put per capita loans by financial institutions to capture each 
province’s financial development. These control variables prevent my result from being 
driven by sectoral structure and financial development rather than more tax effort.
In addition to potentially relevant economic characteristics that might influence 
fiscal revenue, we might worry that provincial leaders’ political relationship with the 
central government were correlated with pre-1994 marginal sharing rates and therefore 
drive the pattern we observe. I therefore use provincial political ties by Shih, Victor
(2004)61to deal with the concern.
In Table 2.3, the interaction term, sharing rate^re x pos£94*, always has a sig­
nificant and negative coefficient. Specifically, for value added tax, in Columns (1 ) 
and (2), provinces with a 0% pre-1994 marginal sharing rate increase by 23% after 
1994 compared to provinces with a 100% pre-reform sharing rate. For business tax, 
in Columns (3) and (4), provinces with a 0% pre-1994 marginal sharing rate increase 
by 27% after 1994 compared to provinces with a 100% pre-reform sharing rate. For 
enterprise income tax, in Column (5), provinces with a 0% pre-1994 marginal sharing 
rate increase by 31% after 1994 compared to provinces with a 100% pre-reform sharing 
rate. The coefficients for the number of state-level special economic zones are positive 
and significant, showing that provinces which are more open to foreign business gen­
erate more tax revenue. The coefficients for per capita loans by financial institutions 
are positive and significant, suggesting that provinces with better financial develop­
ment generate more tax revenue. The coefficients for political ties are negative and 
significant, suggesting that having a good relationship with the central government is 
an asset for the provincial level governments to perform relatively weaker in terms of 
tax revenue collection.
Falsification T est It is argued that the official classification of local revenue (thus, 
local marginal sharing rate) and central revenue might not m atter too much de-facto 
in China, given the complicated inter-governmental transfer system. For example, 
Young (2000) shows the ratio of central expenditure to local expenditure is relatively 
stable before and after the 1994 reform, although the 1994 tax separating reform 
dramatically changed the ratio of central revenue to local revenue. It seems that the 
link between local revenue and local expenditure is not very tight in China. Therefore, 
the change in the local marginal sharing rates of tax revenue in the 1994 reform might 
just be a nominal event, which does not influence local behavior at all. Potentially 
local governments know that what is called local revenue is not strictly adhered to 
when it comes to expenditure. Then, it might be a counter fact to the incentive 
story I addressed in the paper that says the local marginal sharing rate does matter. 
As a result, I run regressions on local budgetary expenditure. The main idea in the
60Refer to Chapter l ’s discussions about Special Economic Zones.
61 Shih, Victor(2004): Database on Provincial Factional Affiliation with Standing Committee Mem­
bers of the Chinese Communist Party: 1978-2004
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robustness check is if local governments collect more when they were offered a higher 
share, it must be because they could spend more.
In Table 2.3, Columns (7) and (8 ), the interaction term, sharing ra te^6 x post94t, 
always has a significant and negative coefficient, which suggests that provinces with 
a lower starting level experienced a larger increase in local expenditure after the 1994 
reform. Column (7) suggests that local budgetary expenditure of provinces with a 0% 
pre-1994 marginal sharing rate increases by 38% after 1994 compared to provinces with 
a 100% pre-reform sharing rate. The coefficients for local control variable, per capita 
GDP, are positive and highly significant, showing that provinces with higher fiscal 
capacity get to spend more. The coefficients for local control variable, the number of 
state-level economic zones, are positive and significant, showing that provinces which 
are more open to foreign firms get to spend more. The coefficients for per capita 
loan are all positive and significant, suggesting that provinces with better financial 
development get to spend more. The coefficients for political ties are negative and 
significant, suggesting that having a good relationship with the central government 
is an asset for the provincial government to perform relatively weaker in terms of 
budgetary spending. Local expenditure does differ for two groups after the 1994 
reform, suggesting that the local marginal sharing rates are credible. Provinces did 
face different incentives throughout the 1994 reform. If the 1994 reform induced local 
marginal sharing rate change is null, we should not observe significant differences in 
local expenditure.
2 .6  E x tra -b u d getary  R even u e
In the former sections, I have analyzed the 1994 reform’s effects on different provinces 
in terms of their fiscal effort in budgetary taxes. In the following part, I will conduct 
analysis on provincial governments’ effort in extra-budgetary revenue (Appendix E 
for detail), using the heterogeneity in pre-existing local budgetary sharing rates. The 
prediction should be, after 1994 (given the presence of nationwide uniform extra- 
budgetary reforms in 1993 and 1998), provinces with lower pre-existing budgetary 
sharing rates will devote less effort to extra-budgetary revenue, compared to those 
with higher pre-existing budgetary sharing rates, as they have benefited more from 
the 1994 tax separating reform in the budgetary category.
2 .6.1 Econom etric Specification
I use similar specifications as section 2.5.
P E R n = on +  Pt +  7 (sharing r a t^ re x post94t) +  X it5 +  Ea (2.3)
The coefficient of interaction term, 7 , will capture the effect of the pre-reform
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budgetary sharing rate on the after reform extra-budgetary revenue.
P E R it = oii +  6 x post94t +  (3 x trendt -I- 0 \post94t x trendt]
+D93t +  D98t +  7 (sharing r a t^ re x post94t) +  X 'it8 +  (2.4)
The only difference between equation (2.4) and equation (2 .2 ) comes from two 
dummies D9Zt and D98t, which are used to control for nationwide uniform extra- 
budgetary reforms in 1993 and 1998.
2.6.2 R esults
In Table 2.4, Columns (1) and (2), the coefficients for sharing rateF* x post94t are 
positive and significant, suggesting that provinces with lower pre-1994 budgetary shar­
ing rates devoted less effort to extra-budgetary revenue after 1994. Particularly, per 
capita extra-budgetary revenue of provinces with a 0% pre-1994 budgetary sharing 
rate reduces by 55% after 1994 compared to provinces with a 100% pre-reform shar­
ing rate. This is consistent with the results I found in the previous regression that the 
provinces with lower pre-1994 marginal sharing rates had more to gain in the bud­
getary sharing rates through the 1994 tax separating reform, compared to provinces 
with higher pre-1994 marginal sharing rates. The findings indicate the substitutabil­
ity between the budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue. The coefficients for 
local control variable, per capita GDP, are positive and highly significant, showing 
that provinces with higher fiscal capacity collect more extra-budgetary revenue.
2.6.3 Robustness Check
In Table 2.4, Columns (3) and (4), the coefficients for sharing r a t ^ e x post94t 
remain at similar levels. Coefficients for additional provincial economic characteristics 
including the number of state-level economic zones and per capita loans by financial 
institutions are positive and significant, showing that provinces which are more open to 
foreign business and have better financial development generate more extra-budgetary 
revenue. The coefficients for political ties are not significant, which suggest that 
having a good relationship with the central government is not influential for the extra- 
budgetary performance. Also, the interaction term, post94t x trendt, has a negative 
coefficient. To recall from Table 2.3, the reform in 1994 increases the trend of tax 
collection as indicated by the positive coefficient of post94t x trendt. The findings 
suggest provincial governments treat budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue 
as substitutes.
Similar results should hold for the extra-budgetary category when it comes to 
the expenditure side. If local governments collect more extra-budgetary revenue, it 
has to be that they could spend more. In Columns (5) and (6 ), the coefficients for 
sharing ra te ^& x post94t are positive and significant, suggesting that provinces with
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higher pre-1994 budgetary sharing rates spent more after 1994. Specifically, Column 
(5) suggests that per capita extra-budgetary expenditure of provinces with a 100% 
pre-1994 budgetary sharing rate increased by 60% after 1994 compared to provinces 
with a 0 % pre-reform sharing rate.
2 .7  C on clu sion
The question of how agencies react to incentive is one of the holy grails in contract 
theory. Empirical studies have been emerging rapidly in the last few decades on 
this issue. However, the way government institutions react to incentive is not widely 
explored.
This paper investigates whether the effect of the 1994 tax separating reform 
- whereby the marginal sharing rate for value added tax decreased to 25% in all 
provinces, and for business tax and enterprise income tax increased to 1 0 0 % in all 
provinces - vary across Chinese provinces with different pre-reform marginal sharing 
rates. The results indicate that budgetary tax has risen more in provinces with a 
lower pre-reform sharing rate compared to those with a higher pre-reform sharing 
rate, while extra-budgetary revenue has increased less in provinces with a lower pre­
reform sharing rate. My analysis suggests that local governments do respond to fiscal 
incentives in a way contract theory predicts, at least in China’s case. Higher share 
of the output (fiscal revenue) does motivate bureaucrats. Moreover, the results in 
this paper indicate that a high marginal sharing rate is beneficial in the sense that it 
enhances tax effort and alleviate local pursuit of extra-budgetary revenue. Therefore, 
in order to achieve efficiency, a better way for China’s central government seems to 
give local governments higher marginal sharing rates in budgetary taxes.
This study concentrated on estimating sub-national government’s fiscal effort with 
respect to fiscal incentive. The sharp change in the marginal sharing rate of the 
taxes, however, may have had a broader impact on the Chinese economy, including 
the potential effect of enhancing the local incentive in promoting local growth. How 
did local governments adjust to such a shock in addition to fiscal revenue collection? 
Studying these additional effects will be the direction of my future work.
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2 .8  F igures and  tab les
Figure  2 .1 : Government Structure in China
Central government 
(Pop: 1.31 billion)
22 provinces & 5 autonomous regions 
(Average pop: 45.7 million)
4 Provincial-level municipalities: 
Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Chongqing 
(Average pop: 17.9 million)
Lower level governments
Source: National Statistical Bureau 2006
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F igure 2 .2 : Geographical Distributions of Provinces with Distinct Pre-existing 
Budgetary Marginal Sharing Rate
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Table 2.1: Difference-in-Difference of Budgetary Tax Revenue
Unit: 10000RMB
Per Capita Value Added 
Tax before 1994 after 1994 difference
prel994<100%
prel994=100%
difference
0.0156
(0.0016)
0.0073
(0.0003)
0.0082***
(0.0016)
0.0644
(0.0064)
0.0287
(0.0014)
0.0357***
(0.0064)
0.0488***
(0.0080)
0.0214***
(0.0018)
0.0274***
(0.0080)
Per Capita Business Tax before 1994 after 1994 difference
0.0079 0.0290 0.0210***
pre!994<100%
(0.0009) (0.0040) (0.0047)
0.0041 0.0112 0.0071***
pre!994=100%
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009)
0.0038*** 0.0177*** 0.0139***
difference
(0.0009) (0.0039) (0.0047)
Per Capita Enterprise before 1994 after 1994 difference
Income Tax
0.0062 0.0223 0.0161***
pre!994<100%
(0.0008) (0.0039) (0.0047)
0.0023 0.0063 0.0040***
pre!994=100%
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0008)
0.0039*** 0.0161*** 0.0121***
difference
(0.0008) (0.0038) (0.0046)
Notes: in the table, we classify 29 provinces into two groups: the one with prel994 sharing rate <100% which
contains 14 provinces; the other group with prel994 sharing rate =-100% which contains 15 provinces.
Table 2.2: Budgetary Category: Basic Specification
ln(per capita value added tax) In(per capita business tax) ln(per capita enterprise income 
tax)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preshare*post94 -0.237*** -0.244*** -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.278** -0.391***
(0.090) (0.092) (0.073) (0.075) (0.117) (0.131)
post94 0.196 -0.573*** -3.006***
(0.132) (0.105) (0.187)
trend 0.0173 0.0344*** -0.185***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.019)
post94*trend 0.0209** 0.0121* 0 296***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
Ln(per capita GDP) 0.665*** 0.622*** 0.844*** 0.873*** 1.451*** 0.996***
(0.094) (0.084) (0.075) (0.068) (0.118) (0.118)
Province fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes - Yes - Yes -
Observations 525 525 549 549 544 544
R square 0.964 0.961 0.974 0.972 0.945 0.929
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In the regressions, preshare denotes the average level of marginal sharing 
rate in each province before the reform; post94 is a dummy variable indicating whether it is after the 1994 tax separating reform. We use 
per capita GDP as an important variable to control for potential endogeneity regarding the prel994 budgetary sharing rates.
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Table 2.3: Budgetary Category: Robustness Check
a. Robustness to controls b. Falsification test
Dependent variable
ln(per capita 
value added tax)
ln(per capita 
business tax)
ln(per capita 
enterprise income tax)
Ln(per capita budgetary 
expenditure)
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
presharingrate*post94 -0.214** -0.211** -0.235*** -0.241*** -0.266** -0.345*** -0.321*** -0.343***
(0.090) (0.092) (0.069) (0.072) (0.111) (0.127) (0.040) (0.044)
post94 0.217
(0.135)
-0.679***
(0.104)
-2.959***
(0.185)
-0.559***
(0.063)
trend 0.0303*
(0.016)
0.012
(0.012)
-0.166***
(0.022)
0.020***
(0.007)
post94*trend 0.0213**
(0.009)
0.023***
(0.006)
0.298***
(0.012)
0.081***
(0.004)
Ln(per capita GDP) 0.461*** 0.448*** 0.483*** 0.630*** 0.968*** 0.494*** 0.478*** 0.374***
(0.112) (0.097) (0.088) (0.078) (0.141) (0.136) (0.050) (0.047)
Economic zones 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.033*** 0.046*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Ln(per capita loans) 0.033 -0.007 0.289*** 0.277*** 0.292*** 0.163** 0.148*** 0.130***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.044) (0.045) (0.071) (0.078) (0.026) (0.027)
political ties -0.0166 -0.0105 -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.062*** -0.046*** -0.026*** -0.022***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes -
Observations 525 525 549 549 544 544 573 573
R square 0.964 0.962 0.977 0.975 0.951 0.936 0.991 0.99
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In the regressions, preshare denotes the average level of marginal 
sharing rate in each province before the reform; post94 is a dummy variable indicating whether it is after the 1994 tax separating reform. In 
robustness checks, we add additional provincial characteristics including number of state-level economic zones, per capita loans by financial 
institutions, and political ties between provincial and central leaders to control the business friendliness, financial development and political 
factors that might influence fiscal outcome.
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Table 2.4: Extra Budgetary Category
to
a. Basic specification b. Robustness to controls c. Falsification test
ln(per capita extra ln(per capita extra ln(per capita extra
Dependent variable budgetary revenue) budgetary revenue) budgetary expenditure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
preshare*post94 0.448*** 0.438*** 0.445*** 0.409*** 0.474*** 0.454***
(0.075) (0.081) (0.076) (0.082) (0.077) (0.084)
post94 0.138 -0.154 -0.0287
(0.148) (0.170) (0.174)
trend -0.062*** -0.080*** -0.071***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
post94*trend -0.026*** -0.006 -0.015
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(per capita GDP) 1.384*** 1.357*** 1.178*** 1.258*** 1.149*** 1.228***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097)
Economic zones 0.009* 0.002 0.008* 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(per capita loans) 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.147*** 0.157***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051)
political ties 0.018* -0.004 0.018* -0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes - Yes - Yes -
Observations 705 705 676 676 673 673
R square 0.934 0.923 0.937 0.925 0.933 0.920
Notes: standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** pKO.Ol. Preshare denotes the average marginal sharing rate in each province
before the reform; post94 is a dummy variable indicating whether it is after the 1994 tax separating reform. In robustness check, we add
provincial characteristics including number of state-level economic zones, per capita loans by financial institutions, and political ties between
provincial and central leaders to control the business friendliness, financial development and political factors that might affect the outcome.
Dummies capturing 1993 and 1998 extra-budgetary national wide reforms are included.
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A  T ax R even u e A ssign m en ts
Main Tax base (1980-1983) (1985-1987) and 
(1988-1993)
(1994-)
Central Profits from cen­
trally owned SOEs
Income and adjust­
ment tax from cen­
trally owned SOEs6 2
Income tax of all 
centrally owned 
SOEs
fixed Custom duties and 
income and commer­
cial tax collected by 
customs
Custom duties and 
all ‘VAT and prod­
uct taxes’ collected 
at customs
All customs duty, 
VAT and ex­
cise taxes on 
imports; Exer­
cise/Consumption 
T a x 6 3
Local Profits from Income and adjust­
ment tax from lo­
cally owned SOEs
Income tax and ad­
justment tax of lo­
cally owned state en­
terprises, collectives, 
and private enter­
prises64
fixed locally owned SOEs Income tax from col­
lectively owned en­
terprises
Business tax falling 
on sectors not cov­
ered by VAT
Shared/adj ustable Industrial and com­
mercial tax except 
those described 
above in central 
fixed revenue.
All sales taxes 
(VAT, business tax, 
and product tax) 
6 5 revenues from all 
enterprises
Value-added tax (75 
percent central, 25 
percent provincial) 6 6
Source: world bankl992, 2 0 0 2 ; Wongl995
62‘Tax for profit reform’ was introduced in 1984, when the original profit remittance from SOEs 
was replaced by income and adjustment tax from SOEs.
63it’s a new tax created in the 1994 tax separating reform.
64In 2002, this became a shared tax with a ratio of 50%: 50%. In 2003 and 2004, the ratio was 
changed to be 40% for the local governments
65 In 1984, the original industrial and commercial tax was replaced by Product tax, VAT and business 
tax
66Product Tax was gradually abolished. VAT became the most important tax source, which ac­
counted for about 60% of the total tax revenue
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B  S haring R u le  b etw een  C entra l and  L ocal G overn m ents
1. 1985-1987, in the table of tax, there are three categories (local, central and 
shared ones).
The sharing rule during 1985-1987 was: Province revenue =  0 x central fixed 
income -I- 5 x (local fixed income67 -I- adjustable income)
2. 1988-1993, Province revenue =  0 xcentral fixed income +  S  x (local fixed income 
+  shared income).
3. 1994-2004 Tax separating system: Province revenue =  0 x central exclusively 
tax -I- 1 x local exclusively tax-t- ^  Si x shared tax*
67In China, local fixed income was, in principle, assigned fully to the local government. However, 
the actual practice of revenue sharing in China has not matched this scheme. Both "local fixed" and 
"shared" taxes have been subject to sharing, apparently because adherence to these categories caused 
a revenue shortfall to the central government.
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C D a ta  S ou rce and  P ro cessin g  P roced u re
Data Source
• Local budgetary tax indices:
1. TVAT (value added-tax)
2. TBT (business tax)
3. TEIT (enterprise income tax)
Tax revenue 1985-2004 is from China fiscal statistics 1950-1991, China fiscal 
yearbook 1992, 1993, 1994, China 55 years’ statistics and provincial statistical 
yearbooks. The earliest comparable data on Tax is from 1985.
• Local extra-budgetary revenue index:
Extra-budgetary revenue 1980-2005 is from Qian (2005) and China 55 years’ 
statistics.
•  Local budgetary expenditure and extra-budgetary expenditure:
Expenditure series 1980-2005 is from Qian (2005) and China 55 years’ statistics.
•  local fiscal incentive indices:
1 . MS (marginal sharing rate of VAT)
2. MSB (marginal sharing rate of Business Tax )
3. MSI (marginal sharing rate of enterprise income tax)
Data from 1980 to 1993 is from Qian (2005), World Bank (1992, 1999), Wong 
(1995).
•  local economic control variables:
1 . GDP, Gross Domestic Product
2 . POP, population
3. Economic Zones (national level economic zones)
4. Loans of financial institutions
5. Political ties with the central government
GDP, POP and Loans between 1985 and 2004 are from China statistical year­
books and China 55 years statistics. Economic Zone indicator is from State 
Council of China; China’s National Development and Reform Commission (2006). 
Political ties are from Shih, Victor (2004): Database on Provincial Factional Af­
filiation with Standing Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party: 
1978-2004.
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Data Processing Procedure
1 . TVAT: total value added tax; before 1985, China implemented a major tax called 
ICT (industrial and commercial tax). From 1985 to 1993, ICT was replaced by 
three important specific taxes, i.e. value added tax, Product tax and business 
tax. Gradually, the tax base of product tax was replaced by value added tax. 
In 1994, product tax was abolished in all provinces and value added tax took 
over completely. For the data to be comparable with post 1994 value added tax, 
I summed up value added tax and product tax before 1994. Since 1994, the 
provincial statistics just take into account the 25% shared part of value added 
tax revenue. I divided the original statistics by 25% to get the total value added 
tax revenue generated in every province.
2. TEIT: total enterprise income tax; between 1985 and 1994, there were separate 
enterprise income tax categories, including state-owned enterprise income tax, 
state-owned enterprise adjustment tax, Income tax from collectively owned en­
terprises and income tax from private enterprises. After 1994, the above were 
replaced by a single tax category named enterprise income tax. I summed up 
the state-owned enterprise income tax, state-owned enterprise adjustment tax, 
Income tax from collectively owned enterprises and income tax from private en­
terprises before 1994 in order to be comparable with the post 1994 statistics. In 
2002, the statistics just take into account the 50% shared part of local govern­
ments. From 2003 to 2004, the statistics take into account the 40% shared part 
of local governments. I divided the original statistics by the respective sharing 
rate to  get comparable data.
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Marginal Sharing Rates o f Budgetary Taxes and Extra-budgetary  
Revenue
Value A dded Tax
s :
ssssr IS !
"E55*T
IMS 1990 1996 2000 2006
1966 1990 1996 2000 2006 1966 1990 1996 2000 2006 1966 1990 1996 2000 2006 1966 1990 1996 2000 2006 1966 1990 1996 2000 2006
year
K pro 1994 sharing rate< 100% o marginal sharing rate=100%
Business Tax
s : 3S l _Ou«nB#_
7H=»a:.
"ST
S1»»» Standoro' -sssr
1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
~r5NiT
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
x pre 1994 sharing rate< 100% C prel 994 sharing rate= 100%
m
ar
gi
na
l 
sh
ar
in
g 
ra
te 
of
 e
xt
ra
-b
ud
ge
ta
ry
 
re
ve
nu
e 
ma
rg
ina
l s
ha
rin
g 
ra,e
 o
f e
n,e
rp
ns
e 
inc
om
e 
tax
2 FISCAL INCENTIVE AND CHINA’S PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 77
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3 Fiscal Incentive and M unici­
pal Real Estate Boom
3.1  In tro d u ctio n
In Chapter 2 , we evaluate the effect of the intergovernmental revenue sharing rate on 
provincial government’s fiscal effort and shed light on how government agencies react 
to incentives under a multi-tasking framework. Despite the fact that various categories 
of fiscal revenue are used as the ultimate outcomes to capture fiscal effort, we cannot 
explore in detail what the exact channels of such efforts are due to data constraints. 
The change in fiscal revenue might come from the local governments’ effort at better 
enforcement or through boosting the fiscal revenue base, and this chapter attempts to 
disentangle these channels.
This paper confines the focus to the governing authority at Chinese municipal 
level, which is below provincial government and so provides insight into the issues at 
a more micro level. In particular, we investigate how municipal governments react 
to the powerful fiscal incentive change, i.e. local fiscal sharing rate, in terms of their 
economic development strategy by exploiting an exogenous fiscal reform in 2002. In 
contrast to the previous chapter, we are able to explicitly point out the fiscal effort in 
the direction of the change in resource allocations controlled by local governments.
Chinese governance is characterized by a regionally decentralized authoritarian sys­
tem (Xu, 2010) - a highly centralized political and personnel control at the national 
level, and a decentralized administrative and economic system at the local level68. 
Local governments were assigned the exclusive right over what is to become an in­
creasingly important tax category, i.e. the business tax, which consists primarily of 
taxes levied upon the construction and real estate sector and also, to a lesser extent, 
other service sectors since 1994. Moreover, they were given official recognition for 
being the de jure owner of not merely the enterprises established under their jurisdic­
tion, but also more importantly of land (the 15th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China, 1997; Xu, 2010). In 2002, the central state of China attenuated the 
claims of local governments over important budgetary tax revenue, i.e. reduced the 
local governments’ share in enterprise income tax by a substantial 50%, but left the 
local sharing rate of business tax and land sales69 at 100%. We argue that the fiscal
68Xu (2010): "Personnel control is a major channel through which the central government controls, 
coordinates and motivates sub-national officials. With this instrument the Chinese regime implements 
a centrally-controlled decentralization, in which most tasks of reforms and economic development are 
carried out by sub-national governments. On the one hand regional officials control huge amounts of 
resources including land, credit and government owned firms and they enjoy fairly broad autonomies 
within their jurisdictions; on the other hand, their career paths are controlled by the central gov­
ernment. Specifically, appointments, promotions and demotions of sub-national officials in China are 
determined by the central government, and their career paths are tied to the performance of their 
jurisdictions. This makes Chinese economy fundamentally different from a federal system."
69Land sale is a big contributor to local extra-budgetary revenue.
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intergovernmental relationship change made local governments choose to switch their 
development strategy to urbanization as articulated in the boom of the real estate 
sector in recent years to generate alternative fiscal revenue, i.e. business tax and land 
sale extra-budgetary revenue.
In order to guide empirical analysis, we first construct a model of multi-tasking 
agent in which local officials maximize the net fiscal profits they are allowed to keep 
within their jurisdictions through their controls over inputs including land and credit 
as well as through the preferences of higher officials who control their job retention 
and promotion. The model predicts that when incentives in terms of local sharing 
rate of an important local budgetary tax such as enterprise income tax decreases, 
local governments axe expected to shift their controlled resources into sectors that are 
the main bases of other fiscal categories such as business tax and land sales on which 
they enjoy 1 0 0 % sharing rate.
We test the above prediction using a unique and comprehensive dataset that cov­
ers 326 Chinese municipalities and provides information on investment in the real 
estate sector, real estate sales, real estate constructions, local budgetary revenue and 
land sales from the early 1990s to 2008. We exploit the fiscal regime change in 2002 
that cut the local sharing rate of enterprise income tax to identify local governments’ 
behavior change. The validity of our identification strategy lies in the fact that the 
big policy change is a common shock to all Chinese municipalities and was not cap­
tured by local interests, therefore should be regarded as exogenous in this context. 
We find that cutting the local sharing rate on enterprise income tax increases local 
governments’ resources allocation including land and capital towards the real estate 
sector, where they axe sole residual claimants of alternative fiscal categories (business 
tax revenue and land sale extra-budgetary revenue). Specifically, since 2002 the ratio 
of investments in the real estate sector has increased by 0.5 percentage points; the 
per capita sale area of the real estate sector has increased by 2 1 %; the per capita 
constructed area driven by the real estate development has increased by 17%. More 
importantly, municipal per capita land sale revenue from converting agricultural land 
into commercial use has increased by 198% since 2002, which is consistent with the 
fact that the sale price of real estate has soaxed tremendously in recent years.
The results axe further tested from four aspects: first, the effect of the 2002 fiscal 
reform on real estate development is not driven by some presumably richer region. 
Second, the enterprise income tax base measured as pre-tax profits shrunk after 2 0 0 2 , 
which support the hypothesis of substitution among fiscal categories. Third, one key 
problem of the identification source is that the 2 0 0 2  reform-induced change in the fiscal 
sharing rate is common across all local jurisdictions in China. Hence, the reform cre­
ates only time vaxiation in the fiscal sharing rate, there is no cross-sectional variation 
across different municipalities. Thus, our empirical strategy is basically a before-after 
comparison, controlling for a linear trend in the different outcome variables. There are 
concerns that the results seem to be driven by a long-run nonlinear (convex) trend in
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the outcome variables, whereas we axe allowing only for a linear trend. We therefore 
add a quadratic trend into the specifications and find weaker but still consistent re­
sults. Fourth, to go beyond the pure time variation, we extend our empirical exercise 
by comparing municipalities with different pre-existing shares of their revenue com­
ing from the enterprise income tax. The effect of the 2002 fiscal reform is supposed 
to be bigger for the municipalities with a greater enterprise income tax share. As a 
result, we include an interaction term of the pre- 2 0 0 2  enterprise income tax share and 
reform dummy in the specification. A difference in difference approach is then used 
to identify the heterogeneous effect of the 2 0 0 2  reform depending on the pre-existing 
enterprise income tax share. We find supporting evidence for land sales and real estate 
constructions that the effect of the 2 0 0 2  fiscal reform is greater on municipalities with 
a larger pre-existing share of enterprise income tax.
The legal rights of land conversion with which local officials have been assigned and 
the fiscal incentive embedded in these rights have led to, on one hand, dramatically 
increased fiscal revenue from land sales and the real estate sector and on the other 
hand, worsening social conflicts between local governments and the general public 
including farmers whose lands were taken with very low compensation as well as 
residents who could not afford high price of housing in recent years (Guo, 2001; Li 
and O’Brien, 2008).
The policy implication of our findings is that decentralized economic and adminis­
trative power of local governments has to be matched with well-designed incentives to 
benefit the majority of population within the jurisdictions. In the Chinese case stud­
ied in this paper, the distorted fiscal incentive for local governments towards the real 
estate sector and agricultural land conversion indeed benefited certain interest groups 
(for example, real estate developers and local officials) at the expense of farmers and 
residents70.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature studying how the intergovern­
mental revenue sharing rate affects the government’s behavior71. Our work may be 
distinguished from previous studies in three aspects. First, we use municipalities at 
a much more disaggregate level as the unit of observation, in contrast to those using
70In the empirical section, we will run tests on agricultural land conversion as well as real estate 
sales.
71 In recent years there has been a growing literature discussing the role the structure of fiscal revenue 
sharing between upper-level governments and local governments plays in local business development 
including Zhuravskaya (2000), Lin and Liu (2000), Qian and Weingast (2005). However, the available 
evidence focuses on provincial governments and does not pertain to the issues at the local level. 
Also, the above work argued higher local stake in fiscal revenue motivated local governments to 
promote economic growth. It is very likely that the fiscal incentive captures the effect of other reform 
measures. Thus, the causal impact of fiscal incentive on local economic development is exposed to 
the endogeneity problem. Wang (2010) focused on how the 1994 tax separating reform impacted 
Chinese provincial governments’ behavior, i.e. local governments’ fiscal efforts in budgetary and 
extra-budgetary revenue corresponding to the fiscal sharing rate change; Kung etc (2009) argues that 
under a regional decentralized authoritarian regime, the change of fiscal incentive in 2002 makes local 
governments switch from industrialization to an urbanization process. However, the two papers are 
not able empirically to identify the exact channels that local governments participate in the regional 
economy.
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provincial governments or countries. The unique dataset enables us to explore the im­
pact of fiscal incentive on local government’s behavior in more detail. Second, using an 
exogenous fiscal reform in 2 0 0 2  that is common to all Chinese municipalities, we are 
able to identify the effect of incentive change more clearly with a potentially smaller 
threat of the endogeneity problem. Third, we embed the study of fiscal incentive 
within a regionally decentralized authoritarian system in the analytical framework of 
a multi-tasking agent model. This allows us explicitly to pin down the mechanisms 
by which local governments influence regional economy.
The next section introduces the institutional background of China’s fiscal regime 
change and land use policy. Section 3.3 presents a theoretical model on local gov­
ernments’ objective function from which we derive testable hypotheses. Section 3.4 
illustrates our data and identification strategy. Section 3.5 presents the results. Sec­
tion 3.6 runs robustness checks. Section 3.7 concludes.
3 .2  B ackground
The Chinese government consists of a region-based multi-level hierarchy. Below the 
central government there are four levels of sub-national governments: provincial level, 
municipal level, county level and township level (Appendix: Government Structure 
in China). A salient feature of the Chinese governance structure is the relatively 
hands-off approach taken by the national government with respect to most of the 
national economy. On the other hand, sub-national governments are deeply involved 
in the economies within their jurisdiction, including fiscal issues72, the allocation of 
land, regional firms and in the past exercising substantial controls over the allocation 
of bank credit (Gordon and Li, 2009). Meanwhile, their job retention and promo­
tion are largely controlled by higher officials based on economic performance. Under 
this regional decentralized authoritarianism (Xu, 2010), the fiscal intergovernmental 
relationship combined with local governments’ deep participation into the regional 
economies influence local governments’ behavior and thus regional economic develop­
ment.
3.2.1 F iscal R egim e
From the 1980s to 1993, local governments in China were offered a generous sharing 
rate on the fiscal revenue generated in their jurisdiction. As local governments got 
a significant amount of fiscal revenue via fiscal contracting, the central government 
lost its dominant control over the whole fiscal system. The state thus tightened fiscal
72 Although by constitution China is not a federal state, in many important economic issues, Chinese 
sub-national governments are more powerful than their counterparts in federal countries around the 
world. Contrasting China’s fiscal decentralization with its counterparts in the rest of the world during 
the early 2000s, the total expenditure of Chinese sub-national governments accounted for about 70% 
of the national total, which was far larger than that of the world’s largest federal countries such as 
the U.S. (46%), Germany (40%) and Russia (38%) (Wong, 2006).
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control in 1994 by redefining tax rights between the national and regional govern­
ments and took more in taxes from the localities73. While the central government has 
since the 1994 fiscal reform reclaimed a substantial share of the tax revenues, local 
governments were compensated by gaining other rights in the process. Specifically, 
they were assigned the exclusive right over what is to become an increasingly impor­
tant tax category, the business tax. This consists primarily of taxes levied upon the 
construction and real estate sector and to a lesser extent also other service sectors. 
Moreover, local governments were given official recognition for being the de jure owner 
of not merely the enterprises established under their jurisdiction (local sharing rate 
being 100% for enterprise income tax), but more importantly also of land (the 15th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1997; Xu, 2010). By converting 
farmland for a variety of development projects (selling it to either real estate develop­
ers74 or the so-called “urban development investment vehicles” that local governments 
themselves invest in), local governments axe able both to collect fees associated with 
land conversion, and they axe entitled to even more lucrative land conversion income75. 
This is an income stream over which it has been assigned exclusive rights by the central 
government commencing in 1994.
In 2002, similar in spirit to the 1994 reforms, the central government proposed to 
appropriate 50% of the enterprise income tax (increased to 60% in 2003). The main 
argument of the central government (Chinese State Council Document No. 37 (2001)) 
is tha t 1 0 0 % sharing rate of enterprise income tax will enhance the influence of local 
governments on the firms within their jurisdictions and create barriers for further 
enterprise reform. High stakes in local enterprises might induce regional governments 
to obstruct fair competition76. However, the central state did not take a fraction of 
the business tax, nor land sale revenue. As displayed in Figure 3.1, after the regime 
change the importance of enterprise income tax in local budgetary revenue decreased
73 In particular, central government classifies the fiscal revenue as central exclusive tax (local sharing 
rate 0%), local exclusive tax (local sharing rate 100%), and shared tax (local sharing rate between 
0 and 100%). It wrestled from local governments the exclusive rights over a newly established con­
sumption tax over such inelastic consumption products as beer, hard liquor and cigarettes, as well as 
reassigned a 75% of value-added tax to itself.
74 Real estate developers purchase a tract of land, determine the marketing of the property, de­
velop the building program and design, obtain the necessary public approval and financing, choose 
the builders to build the structure, and ultimately sell it. Developers work with many different 
counterparts along each step of this process, including architects, city planners, engineers, surveyors, 
inspectors, contractors, leasing agents and more.
75 Although conversion of cultivated land for urban and rural construction can be dated to the late 
1980s, thanks initially to the rural housing construction boom and subsequently to industrial, trans­
port and urban developments, the magnitude of revenues was miniscule at that time. For instance, 
the amount of fees collected from land leasing totaled only 242 billion yuan nationwide between 1987 
and 1994 (State Land Management Bureau, 1998, cited in Lin and Ho, 2005), which pales greatly in 
comparison with the 901 billion yuan or 90% of the entire revenue received during the three years 
between 2001 and 2003.
76Qian (1996): "Separation of government and enterprise has long been recognized by economists 
and government officials in China as a key to enterprise reform. Unless the issues of state ownership, 
government organization, and the role of the Party are addressed directly, separation of government 
and enterprise cannot materialize."
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from 13% before 2002 to 6 % afterwards; the importance of business tax increases from 
19% before 2002 to 23% afterwards.
3.2.2 L and  U se R igh t
Arable land in China is de jure collectively-owned. In this system, the commune 
authorities represented the collectives before the reform, and the village authorities 
represented them afterwards. Although rights of use and income over land have been 
reassigned to the farm households since the land reform of the early 1980s, the farmers 
have no right to alter the land’s usage, or to transfer it to another party. The crucial 
right to transfer these rights has remained in the hands of the state and, in part, of 
the village authorities. However, the collective owners have no right to convert arable 
land into non-arable usages. Nationalization has been the only legal mechanism by 
which farmland can be converted into non-arable usages since any non-arable usage 
of collective farmland requires a change from collective to state ownership (Articles 
43 and 63 of the P.R.China’s Land Management Law). Moreover, the law confines 
farmers’ rights in land to basically an “agrarian” usage when land use is changed 
to non-agrarian and ownership converted (from collective to state). In other words, 
farmers would only be compensated according to the value of crop production after 
conversion, even though the land post-conversion may be far more valuable. Apart 
from the minimal compensation which is legally protected, China’s farmers are subject 
to the whims of local authorities in the process of land conversion (Kung, Xu and Zhou, 
2009).
3 .3  A  T h eo retica l M od el
In this section we focus on how the available sources of revenue affect the incentives 
faced by Chinese officials. That there exists an intimate relationship between the 
performance of regional officials and their career prospects is already well documented 
in a number of studies77. Therefore, our set-up follows the structure of the Tiebout 
(1956) model in that the utility of officials depends on their net scale profits: tax 
revenue, plus income generated by land rents minus expenditures on public services.
S et up:
1. A g ricu ltu ra l sec to r
Farmers use capital K f , labor Ly, land A j  as their inputs. The public goods 
provided by local governments G will also influence their productivity. There­
fore, we assume that agricultural output Q f = F( Kf , L f , A / ] G) .  Farmers have
77Tsui and Wang (2004), for instance, show that 60% of the targets required of leading provincial 
officials are related to “economic construction”. Moreover, the lower the level of regional governments 
the more concrete the stipulated targets become (Edin, 2003). Well performed municipal officials even 
transferred to other provinces as governors (Xu et al., 2007)..
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use rights to their land. However, given state-ownership of land, local govern­
ments are capable of converting the agricultural land A f  for commercial use. 
Compensation c will be paid to farmers for land conversion, which is equal to 
marginal product of labor employed in agriculture c =  PfFLf ( K f ,L f ,A f ,G ) 
(according to the P.R. China’s Land Management Law in section 3.2.2). Pf is 
the price of agricultural output. Flj is the marginal output of labor employed 
in agriculture. Also, for simplicity, assume that an agricultural tax rate a is 
levied on output Q f.
2. In d u s tr ia l an d  Service secto rs
Turnover tax- business tax:
The business tax rate levied on sector i is 6*; the tax base is PiQi(Ki, Li, Af, G), 
where Pi is the price, output Qi =  F(Ki, Li, A{\G), Ki is capital, Li denotes 
labor input, Ai denotes land input. The output also depends on the public 
goods provided by local governments G.
Enterprise income tax:
The enterprise income tax rate of sector i is t*; tax base is firm profit 7r» =  
P j(l — bi)Qi(K{, Li, A i; G) — wLi — rK i — qAi, where w is wage, r  is interest rate, 
q is land rent paid by sector i.
3. Local governm ents:
n
Local governments get land sales revenue by converting agricultural
i= l
land for commercial use (commercial residential/commercial business buildings), 
where Ai denotes converted land used as inputs in sector i, q is land rent paid. 
Local governments provide public goods to local residents at a level G, there is a 
minimum level G that should be maintained in order to function the municipality 
properly. Therefore, G ^  G.
4. R esource constra in ts:
n
Limited land stock: ^  Ai +  A / = A t ’,
7=1
for the moment, we assume that the supply of domestic capital is fixed as well,
n
based on the deposits under the control of local banks, i.e. Y ^ K i + K f  = K r ,
7=1
n
limited labor supply due to the Hukou system78: J 2 L i + L ,  = LT .
1= 1
78 The Hukou system refers to the system of residency permits in China. With its large rural 
population of poor farm workers, Hukou limited mass migration from the land to the cities to ensure 
some structural stability.
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The objective of officials is to maximize the sum of tax revenue from firms, agri­
cultural taxes, and land sales revenue, minus compensation to farmers and minus the 
net cost (net of user fees) of public expenditures on local infrastructure.
n n n n
max S i{^2Ti7ri(Ki,Li1Ai;G)}+S2{y£2biPiQi(Ki,Li,Ai;G)}+ oQf +Ss^jqAi -  c ^ A i - G
”  *= 1  i= 1  it i t  i= 1  *= 1en te rp rise  incom e ta x  business ta x  ag n cu  u ra i ax  land  conversion
n
s t : ^  A * A f  =  A t ',
i— 1 
n
J2K i + K f = KT',
* =  i
n
+ Lf =  Lt ;
i = i
G ^ G .
Given the local sharing rate of business tax revenue Si, enterprise income tax 
revenue S2, land sale revenue S3, officials then allocate land A{ and capital Ki among 
different sectors and choose how much to spend on each form of public services G to 
maximize expression (1).
0  dTiTTi(Ki, Li,Ai\ G) , 0  dbiPiQiiK^L^AnG)  , dQf  , a dc
S i ---------- 5 - 3  b S2-------------5 - 3 ----------------h 0-z~r~ +  S3q - c  -  w r-A i  =  0oAi oAi aAi oAi
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------V--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------'
marginal benefit of allocating land into sector t
0  dTiTri{Ki,Li,Ai;G) dbiPiQ^K^LuA^G) dQf dc
Sl--------------M ----------------+  5 2 ---------------- M -------------------+ trMi ~ M Ai =  ° '  V ! =  1 1 2 .........n
' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- '
m arginal benefit of allocating capital into sector t 
n n
O lJ^T M K i.L ^A n G )}  d l ^ T i^ K ^ L u A ^ G ) }
Sl 8G + S l  dG +  ° ~ § G ~ 1 =  0
As suggested by the above expressions, optimal allocation of inputs controlled by 
local governments should be such that the marginal benefit of allocating inputs into 
each sector is equal.
Proposition  1 Subject to factor input constraints and public good provision respon­
sibility, when the sharing rate on enterprise income tax S \ reduces significantly, local
governments m il turn to sector i which generates more business tax and land revenue,
dK* dA*with local sharing rate S2 =  S3 =100%. Equivalently, < 0; < 0. Therefore,
we should expect Ki and A{ to increase in sector i which is the main revenue base of 
business tax and land sales.
Intuitive explanation behind the proposition is that when Si reduces, the marginal 
benefit of allocating inputs in the related sector decreases. Local governments would 
reoptimize by shifting resources into other sectors with higher fiscal sharing rate, i.e. 
higher marginal benefit. In the case of China, construction and real estate sectors
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axe the main tax bases of business tax (over 40% in 2000s) and more importantly the 
major demanding side of land for commercial use.
Based on proposition 1, we should observe that since 2002, when local sharing rate 
of enterprise income tax was reduced to 50%, local governments needed to put more 
resources into the real estate sector and the construction sector and sell more land for 
revenue.
1. The investment in the real estate sector Ki increases;
2. The sales and constructions of the real estate sector Q i(K i,L i,A f,G )  have in­
creased since 2002;
3. The land sales revenue (qAi) by local governments from converting agricultural 
land into commercial use (A*) has increased since 2002; equivalently, land sales 
as a very important way to get extra-budgetary revenue increased.
3 .4  D a ta  and  E m pirica l S tra teg y
3.4.1 D ata
In order to evaluate the impact of the 2002 fiscal reform on local governments’ behav­
ior change, we constructed a new panel dataset on 326 Chinese municipalities. The 
dataset tracks Chinese municipalities on real estate investment, total investment, real 
estate buildings sales, constructions as well as land sales. Table 3.1 displays descrip­
tive statistics for the variables that we use in this paper. The Data Appendix contains 
more details on these variables.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The aim of the empirical exercise is to evaluate whether the 2002 fiscal reform led local 
governments to promote the real estate sector development and accelerate land sales. 
To do that, we exploited the fact that in 2002, the central government cut the local 
sharing rate of enterprise income tax to 50%. This is an exogenous policy shock to 
all municipalities that is not captured by local interests. The underlying assumption 
is tha t the evolution of the outcome variables such as real estate development and 
land sales should not change significantly in the absence of fiscal regime change. If 
the hypotheses from the previous section that local governments will switch their 
development strategy to boost sectors which axe main sources of business tax and 
land sales axe true, we should observe incremental effect since 2002. The approach 
we use is essentially a difference approach by comparing each municipality’s post2002 
evolution to its own pre-existing performance. Also, it is worth mentioning that there 
axe no other reforms in 2002 that might contaminate the validity of our identification.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic idea behind the identification strategy without rig­
orous regressions. Since 2002, when the central government cut the local sharing rate
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of enterprise income tax to 50% from 100%, per capita municipal sales and construc­
tions related to the real estate sector have increased significantly, i.e. the slope of the 
real estate sales and constructions became steeper from 2002 onwards. The pattern we 
observe in Figure 3.2 (a, b) is consistent with the underlying fact that the construction 
and real estate (CRE) sectors have been a major contributing source of business tax 
revenue. The relative importance of CRE sectors to business tax had increased over 
time—from 30% in 2000 to almost 50%, in 200779.
Figure 3.3 shows that after 2002 land sales soar dramatically. By converting agri­
cultural land into commercial use, local governments benefit greatly in terms of fiscal 
revenue. In particular, the boom of the real estate sector benefits local governments 
in two ways. First, Figure 3.2 shows that it contributes to the budgetary revenue (i.e. 
business tax) of which local governments have 100% sharing rate, next, selling the land 
to developers generates even more sizable extra-budgetary revenue (land sale revenue) 
of which local governments are residual claimants. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3.4, 
the proportion of land sale revenue to local budgetary tax revenue increases from 6%
To evaluate formally the effect of the 2002 fiscal reform on the real estate sector 
development and measures of land sales, we estimate the following specifications:
Yit will be variables including investment, sales and constructions of the real estate 
sector, land sales area and revenue. post2002t is a dummy capturing the 2002 fiscal 
reform which sets the local sharing rate of enterprise income tax to 50% from 100%, 
post2002t = 1 if year y  2002. In specification (3.1), a , is the municipality fixed ef­
fect, which captures municipal time-invariant factors that influence the outcome. For 
example, we expect the geographical location or natural endowment of the municipal­
ity to affect real estate development. Also, we control for time varying factors that 
might influence real estate development by adding a common trend into the regression. 
There are big concerns that municipalities are already on their own growing trends in 
the absence of the hypothetical impact from the 2002 fiscal reform. To address the 
issue, in specification (3.2), we use a more rigorous time control variable mtrend.it in 
the regression, which allows each municipality to have its own growing path. After 
controlling for the municipality specific trend, the effect of 2002 fiscal regime change 
on municipal outcomes - the coefficient of post2002t will be identified by the deviation 
from its own trend, if there is any. The regressions all cluster the standard errors at the
79The ratios are calculated based on China tax yearbooks 2001 to 2008.
in 1999 to 27% in 2002, and 40% in 2008.
3.4.3 Empirical Specification
Yu =  <*i +  trendt +  /3 x post2002t +  £u 
Yit — ai +  m trendit +  A x post2002t +  £it
(3.1)
(3.2)
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level of municipality to deal with potential problems of serial correlation (Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan (2004)). We do not put per capita GDP or urbanization as 
control variables into the regression as these indicators axe highly endogenized with 
respect to real estate development. It is difficult to argue whether per capita GDP 
and urbanization lead to more real estate development or the other way round.
3 .5  R esu lts
Table 3.2 presents the effect of the 2002 fiscal reform on the investment, sale and 
constructions of the real estate sector. In the strongest specification which allows each 
municipality to have its own trend (equation (3.2)), we observe that since 2002, when 
the central government cut the local sharing rate of enterprise income tax from 100% 
to 50%, the ratio of real estate investment in total municipal investment increased by
0.5 percentage points, per capita sale area of the real estate sector increased by 21%, 
and per capita constructed area driven by real estate development increased by 17%.
Table 3.3 displays land sales (from converting agricultural land into commercial 
use) by municipal governments corresponding to the 2002 fiscal reform. Column (2) 
suggests that after taking into account each municipality’s pre-existing growth path, 
per capita sale area of land increases by 22% since 2002. Column (4) suggests that 
municipal per capita land sale revenue increases by 198% from 2002 onwards, which 
implies that the sale price of the land soar greatly as well. The findings confirm that 
local governments switch their controlled resources to alternative fiscal categories with 
local sharing rate equal to 100% when they face a significant cut in one fiscal category.
3 .6  R ob u stn ess  C heck
3.6.1 R obustness Check by Regions
There axe concerns that the municipalities in the east region drive the main results 
since they axe more prosperous and we expect to observe more real estate development. 
If so, the positive correlation between the 2002 dummy that indicates the reduced local 
sharing rate of enterprise income tax and real estate related outcome observed in the 
full sample may be wrongly interpreted as capturing the general impact of the 2002 
fiscal regime change. Therefore, we classify all municipalities into three groups. One 
is the west region, where municipalities are located geographically inland and axe 
relatively less developed. The second group is the central region. The third group 
is the east region, which contains municipalities that axe mostly coastal and richer80.
80 China is officially divided into 3 regions in line with its natural and social resources endow­
ments, historical development, and level of economic development. First, eastern China consists of 12 
coastal provinces and municipalities, namely, Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjing, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi. Second, middle China includes nine 
provinces and autonomous regions, namely, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu), Shanxi, 
Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. Lastly, western China includes the rest of the 10 provinces 
and autonomous regions, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, 
Xinjiang and Tibet (Xizang). As the GDP per capita of Guangxi and Inner Mongolia are approxi­
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We run the following regression.
2
Yu — &i +  mtrendit +  A x  post2002t +  x  post2002t) +  £u (3.3)
R =  1
where R  are two dummy variables capturing if the municipality belongs to the west 
or central region. The coefficient of post2002t, A, corresponds to the effect of the 
2002 fiscal reform on municipalities in the east region, which is the base group in the 
regression. The coefficients of two interactions, 8r , illustrate the impact of the 2002 
fiscal reform on the west region and central region relative to the base group (the east 
region). In Column (1) of Table 3.4, regarding the ratio of real estate investment in 
total investment, the reform has a heterogeneous effect on the municipalities among 
three regions. There is no significant effect on the municipalities within the east 
region. However, for municipalities in the central region, the ratio of real estate 
investment increases by 0.8 percentage points after 2002. For those in the west region, 
the magnitude is even bigger, suggesting an increase of 1.9 percentage points. West 
and central regions increase more in terms of their real estate investment relative 
to the east region as they start from a lower level81. In Column (2), the estimates 
suggest that there is a strong effect of the 2002 fiscal reform on the real estate sale. 
The per capita sale area of real estate increases by 17%, which is a general effect 
to the municipalities belonging to all three regions. In Columns (3) and (4), there 
axe no significant differences across three regions regarding the effect of cutting local 
budgetary sharing rate on real estate constructions and sale revenue. In Column
(5), municipal per capita land sale area increases by 50% after the 2002 fiscal regime 
change for those in the east region, 17% for those in the central region and 7% for 
those in the west region. It suggests that the east region, which is relatively richer and 
presumably has better infrastructures supplies more land for sale after 2002 relative 
to other regions. In Column (6), we observe municipalities within three regions to 
have a similar increase in per capita land sale revenue by 207% after 2002. The 
seemingly puzzling pattern of Columns (5) and (6) is driven by the fact that west 
and central regions are catching up in terms of their land price from a much lower 
pre-existing level82. Therefore, though their area of converted land does not increase 
as much as those in the east region, the incremental effect of the 2002 reform on their 
land sale revenue is equally sizable relative to the latter. Table 3.4 provides us with
mately equivalent to the average level of the GDP per capita of the western 10 provinces and regions, 
the central government decided in 2001 that Guangxi and Inner Mongolia can also have access to the 
preferential policy previously given to the aforementioned 10 provinces and regions, which implies that 
Guangxi and Inner Mongolia are also regarded as western provinces. In this paper, we put Guangxi 
and Inner Mongolia into the Western China group.
81 It should be noted that the identification strategy in this paper is essentially a difference approach 
which compares each municipality’s post 2002 outcome to its own pre-existing level.
82Using the same specification as equation (3.3), we find that land price in the municipalities of the 
central region increases by 77% since 2002; land price in those of the west region rises by 68% since 
2002. Land price in those of the east region increases by 25% from 2002 onwards.
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confidence that the findings from the baseline are not limited to some particularly 
richer municipalities. The 2002 reform has significant effects on municipalities within 
west and central regions as well. Changing local governments’ sharing rate in one 
fiscal category will indeed influence their behavior in terms of economic strategies 
which help boost substitutable fiscal revenue bases.
3.6.2 R obustness Check: Quadratic Trend
A big concern about our identification source is that the 2002 reform-induced change 
in the fiscal sharing rate is common across all local jurisdictions in China. Hence, the 
reform creates only time variation in the fiscal sharing rate. There is no cross-sectional 
variation across different municipalities. The empirical strategy is essentially a before- 
after comparison, controlling for a linear trend in the different outcome variables. 
Looking at the Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the results seem to be driven by a long-run 
nonlinear (convex) trend in the outcome variables, whereas we are allowing only for 
a linear trend. Therefore, a quadratic trend is added into the specifications to deal 
with the concern.
Yu = &i +  mtrendit +  mtrendft +  Ax pos£2002t +  sa  (3.4)
As Table 3.5 shows, significant results still hold for land sales and real estate con­
structions, though the magnitude reduced significantly. For other indictors of the real 
estate development including the real estate investment and real estate sales, the co­
efficients become insignificant, which suggests that allowing richer time-trend controls 
has weaken our results. To certain extent, it reveals the underlying disadvantage of 
using a simple difference approach as our identification strategy.
3.6.3 R obustness Check: Enterprise Incom e Tax Base
In section 3.5, we claim that local governments respond to the reduced sharing rate of 
enterprise income tax by shifting resources into the real estate sector for alternative 
fiscal revenue. As a result, the revenue base of enterprise income tax should instead 
shrink after 2002. Despite the fact that municipal statistics on pre-tax industrial 
enterprise profits are only available from 1998 to 2006 for 282 municipalities83, we test 
the impact of the 2002 fiscal reform on the indicator to provide supporting evidence. 
The specification is the same as section 3.4.3.
In Column (1) of Table 3.6, we find that since 2002 the revenue base of enterprise 
income tax has decreased by 21% after we control for the common national trend. 
In Column (2), which is the strongest specification that allows each municipality to 
have its own trend, we still find a similar effect. The enterprise income tax base has 
exhibited a reduction of 19%. The results of Table 3.6 confirm the existence of a
83Datasource: China city statistical yearbooks 1999 to 2007.
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substitution effect between different fiscal categories.
3 .7  E xten sio n
In this section, we go beyond the pure time variation by comparing municipalities 
with different shares of their revenue coming from the enterprise income tax, which 
is a much more compelling source of identifying variation. We might think that the 
effect of the 2002 fiscal reform would be greater for the municipalities with a greater 
share of their revenue coming from the enterprise income tax. Therefore, we add an 
interaction term p reE IT sh a re i x posi2002* into the empirical specification (Equation 
3.5), which enables us to use a difference in difference approach to identify the different 
effect of the 2002 reform depending on the pre-existing enterprise income tax share. 
The coefficients of the newly added term is expected to be positive, if there is any 
heterogeneous effect.
Yu =  <*i +  m trendu  -I- Ai x {preE IT sh arei x post2002t) + A2 x post2002t +  eu (3.5)
As table 3.7 shows, the 2002 fiscal reform had similar effect on the municipal real 
estate development, which is'captured by the insignificant coefficients of the interaction 
term from column (1) to (4). The coefficients of post2002t are positive and significant, 
suggesting that the reduced local enterprise income tax sharing rate in 2002 leads to an 
average positive effect on municipal real estate development. However, regarding land 
sales, the coefficient of the interaction term, preE IT sh a re i x post2002*, is positive 
and significant, which indicates that the effect is significantly larger for municipalities 
with a greater share coming from enterprise income tax.
3 .8  C onclusion
This paper examines how Chinese municipal governments react to the powerful fiscal 
incentive in terms of their economic development strategy. Guided by the analytical 
framework from a multi-tasking agent model, we test the impact of the exogenous 
fiscal regime change in 2002 that greatly reduced local sharing rate of enterprise in­
come tax on local governments. We find supporting evidence that the change in fiscal 
intergovernmental relationship induces local governments to adjust their behavior.
Compared to previous studies on government incentives, this paper tries to ex­
plore the role of local governments in economic development using the data at a more 
disaggregated level as well as a clean identification strategy. In particular, it shows 
that municipal governments respond to reduced local sharing rate of enterprise in­
come tax by allocating more resources, especially land, from agriculture into the real 
estate sector. Switching their development focus to urbanization as articulated in 
the recent real estate boom, local governments benefit greatly from fiscal categories 
including business tax revenue and land sale extra-budgetary revenue. However, the
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huge amount of land conversion and escalating real estate price cause worsening social 
conflicts between local governments and the general public including farmers whose 
lands were taken with low compensation and residents who are unable to afford the 
housing price.
The findings suggest that regional decentralized economic power should be matched 
with well-designed incentives for local governments and property right protection for 
disadvantaged groups such as farmers. After all, the aim of decentralization is not 
just about motivating local governments to promote overall GDP growth or fiscal rev­
enue, but essentially about making local governance more responsive to local needs 
and bringing the utmost benefits to the large majority of the local population.
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3.9 Figures and tables
Figure 3.1: Ratio of Business Tax and Enterprise Income Tax in Local Budgetary
Revenue
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Note: Ratios of enterprise income tax and business tax in local budgetary revenue are calculated 
based on municipal fiscal revenue statistics. Figure 3.1 describes the average ratio of 326 Chinese 
municipalities. As displayed in the plot, the importance of enterprise income tax in local budgetary 
revenue decreased from 13% before 2002 to 6%; the importance of business tax increases from 19% 
before 2002 to 23% afterwards.
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Figure 3.2: Real Estate Sale and Contruction
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Note: Since 2002, when the central government cut local sharing rate of enterprise income tax 
to 50% from 100%, municipal per capita sales and constructions related to the real estate sector 
increased significantly.
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Figure 3.3: Per capita Land Sales Area and Revenue
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Since 2002, local governments greatly increased the conversion of farmland into commercial use. 
By selling the land to developers, they on one hand benefit from the budgetary category (The con­
struction and real estate sector as the main tax base of business tax) and on the other hand get huge 
extra-budgetary revenue (land sale revenue) on which they are the holy residual claimant.
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F igure 3.4: Ratio of Land Sale Extra-budgetary Revenue to Local Budgetary
Revenue
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Note: land sales revenue as a very important component of extra-budgetary revenue, increases 
dramatically from 6% in 1999 to 27% in 2002, and 40% in 2008 relative to local budgetary revenue 
after 2002, when the central government cut local budgetary sharing rate of enterprise income tax 
from 100% to 50%.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
99
Variables Number o f Obs Mean Standard Error Min Max
Ratio o f real estate 
investment in total 
investment
8722 0.06 0.08 0 0.82
Per capita real estate sale 
area(square meter)
5766 0.2 0.3 0 9.2
Per capita real estate 
construction area (square 
meter)
4625 0.7 1.4 0 28.2
Per capita real estate sale 
revenue (RMB)
5475 485 1406 0 24551
Per capita local budgetary 
revenue (RMB)
8972 377 811 -32 24983
Per capita land sale area 
(Hectare)
3195 1.25 2.18 0 41.68
Per capita land sale 
revenue (RMB)
3195 476 7204 0 405040
Notes: Beginning and end year is 1990 and 2008 for real estate investment, sale and constructions. 
Land sale area and revenue cover years from 1999 to 2008. Data sources and construction are 
described in full in Data Appendix.
Co
Table 3.2: Investment, Sale and Construction of the Real Estate Sector
Dependent Variable
(1)
Ratio of real estate in 
total investment
(2)
Ln( per capita sale area 
of real estate)
(3)
Ln(per capita constructed 
area of real estate)
(4)
Ln( per capita sale 
revenue of real estate)
Post2002 0.004 0.005* 0.294*** 0.188*** 0 419*** 0.154*** 0.140*** 0.043
(0.003) (0.003) (0.045) (0.038) (0.097) (0.059) (0.042) (0.040)
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
National trend Yes - Yes Yes - Yes -
Municipal trend - Yes Yes - Yes - Yes
Number of observations 8722 8722 4322 4322 3506 3506 4178 4178
R square 0.622 0.768 0.834 0.889 0.846 0.916 0.889 0.929
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Post2002 is a 
dummy indicating the 2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate of enterprise income tax from 100% to 50%.
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Table 3.3: Per capita Land Sale by Local Governments
Dependent Variable
(1)
Ln( Per capita sale area of land)
(2)
Ln(Per capita land sale revenue)
Post2002 0.208*** 0.200*** 1.110*** 1.093***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.055) (0.059)
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
National trend Yes - Yes -
Municipality trend - Yes - Yes
Number of observations 3185 3185 3185 3185
R square 0.642 0.689 0.836 0.867
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Post2002 is a dummy indicating the 2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate of 
enterprise income tax from 100% to 50%.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check by Regions
Ratio of real Ln( per capita Ln(per capita Ln( per capita Ln( per Ln(per capita
Dependent Variable estate in total sale area of real constructed area sale revenue of capita sale land sale
investment estate) of real estate) real estate) area of land) revenue)
Post2002 -0.01 0.159*** 0.028 0.016 0.403*** 1.123***
(0.007) (0.048) (0.058) (0.058) (0.051) (0.106)
Central Region*Post2002 0.018** -0.028 0.188 -0.010 -0.247*** 0.166
(0.009) (0.081) (0.126) (0.087) (0.060) (0.142)
West Region*Post2002 0.029*** 0.130 0.271 0.100 -0.339*** -0.230
(0.008) (0.094) (0.166) (0.103) (0.061) (0.146)
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8722 4322 3506 4178 3185 3185
R square 0.769 0.889 0.929 0.926 0.695 0.868
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Post2002 is a dummy indicating the 
2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate o f  enterprise income tax from 100% to 50%. China is officially divided into 3 regions in 
line with its natural and social resources endowments, historical development, and level o f  economic development. First, Eastern Region consists o f  101 
municipalities under 11 coastal provinces, namely, Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjing, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and 
Hainan. Second, Central Region includes 108 municipalities under eight provinces and autonomous regions, namely, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, 
Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. Lastly, Western China includes 121 municipalities under the remaining 12 provinces and autonomous regions, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet.
Table 3.5: Robustness Check: Quadratic Trend
Ratio of real Ln( per capita Ln(per capita Ln( per capita Ln( per Ln(per capita
Dependent Variable estate in total sale area of constructed area sale revenue of capita sale land sale
investment real estate) of real estate) real estate) area of land) revenue)
Post2002 -0.006* 0.059 0.090** -0.044 0.076** 0.592***
(0.003) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.030) (0.072)
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal quadratic trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8722 4322 3506 4178 3185 3185
R square 0.799 0.911 0.934 0.939 0.689 0.867
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.’" p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Post2002
is a dummy indicating the 2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate of enterprise income tax from
100% to 50%. Compared to the baseline specification, the municipal quadratic trend is added to deal with the concern that
there is an ongoing convex trend that was wrongly captured as the effect of the 2002 fiscal reform.
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Table 3.6: Robustness Check: Revenue Base of Enterprise Income Tax
Dependent Variable
Ln(Revenue base of enterprise income tax)
Post2002 -0.191*** -0.178*** 
(0.024) (0.024)
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes
National trend Yes
Municipal trend Yes
Number of observations 2398 2398
R square 0.836 0.861
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Post2002 is a dummy indicating the 2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate of
enterprise income tax from 100% to 50%, In the case when a municipality has negative pre-tax profits, we treat the
enterprise income tax base=0; otherwise, the pre-tax profits of enterprises will be the exact enterprise income tax
base.
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Table 3.7: Extension: A Difference-in-Difference Approach
Dependent Variable
Ratio of real 
estate in total 
investment
Ln( per capita 
sale area of 
real estate)
Ln(per capita 
constructed area 
of real estate)
Ln( per capita 
sale revenue of 
real estate)
Ln( per 
capita sale 
area of land)
Ln(per capita 
land sale 
revenue)
PreEIT share*Post2002 -0.042
(0.036)
-0.471
(0.381)
-0.739
(0.608)
-0.145
(0.396)
1.675***
(0.350)
1.165*
(0.622)
Post2002 0.011**
(0.006)
0.259***
(0.075)
0.267**
(0.128)
0.071
(0.080)
-0.044
(0.049)
0.909***
(0.110)
Municipality fixed effect 
Municipality trend
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of observations 
R square
8545
0.766
4290
0.890
3479
0.917
4148
0.927
3156
0.700
3156
0.866
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Post2002 
is a dummy indicating the 2002 fiscal change, i.e. the central government cut local sharing rate of enterprise income tax from 
100% to 50%. Compared to the baseline specification, we explore a difference in difference approach by adding an interaction 
term, PreEITshare*Post2002, where PreEITshare is the municipality’s share of enterprise income tax in local budgetary revenue 
pre-2002. The coefficient of the interaction term captures the different effect of the 2002 fiscal reform depending on the 
pre-existing share of enterprise income tax in local budgetary revenue, if there is any.
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A  D a ta  A p p en d ix
This appendix provides information on the variables used in this paper.
Sam ple o f M unicipalities:
The dataset includes 326 municipalities of 31 provinces in China. We combine 
Fuyang and Bozhou in Anhui Province to be one municipality, and Baicheng and 
Songyuan to be one municipality due to statistical availability. We omit Laibin and 
Chongzuo of Guangxi Province since they were only established in early 2000s. Due 
to statistical availability, we treat Tibet as a big municipality.
M ain  V ariables an d  S ta tis tic a l Source:
1. T otal Investm en t an d  R eal e s ta te  investm ent:
China city statistical yearbooks (1996-2008); 60th anniversary of People’s Re­
public of China (1949-2009) statistical yearbooks; 30th anniversary of opening 
up Reform statistical books 1978-2008.
2. R eal e s ta te  sale an d  constructions:
China regional statistical yearbooks (2000-2009); Province statistical yearbooks 
(1990s, 2000s).
3. Local B u d g e ta ry  R evenue:
60th anniversary of People’s Republic of China (1949-2009) statistical yearbooks; 
30th anniversary of opening up Reform statistical books 1978-2008.
4. B usiness Tax R evenue:
China regional statistical yearbooks (2001-2009).
5. E n te rp rise  Incom e T ax Revenue:
China regional statistical yearbooks (2001-2009).
6. L and Sales A rea  an d  Revenue:
China land statistical yearbooks (2000-2009).
7. P re - ta x  P ro fits  o f In d u s tr ia l E n terp rises
China city statistical yearbooks (1999-2007).
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